In brief
- The fire protection rules for nuclear installations are replaced in full from 26 October 2026. The new norms have 146 articles, ten chapters and three annexes, across 92 pages, and repeal the Norms on the protection of nuclear power plants against internal fires and explosions, in force since 9 June 2006, that is for 7,444 days.
- The norms no longer stop at the nuclear power plant. Article 2 lists thirteen entries: nuclear power plants, including those equipped with modular reactors, research, test and zero-power reactors and subcritical assemblies, demonstration reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication plants, spent nuclear fuel storage facilities, uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, radioactive waste storage and treatment facilities, detritiation facilities, the mining and milling of uranium and thorium ores, nuclear-specific constructions, and the last entry is an open clause, for any other nuclear installation to which CNCAN decides to apply the norms through the conditions of the authorisation.
- Three figures anyone can check. Intervention at the seat of the fire must begin within no more than 15 minutes of the detection of an incipient fire. Systems with nuclear safety functions are separated from the rest of the installations by barriers resistant to fire for a minimum of 3 hours. Fire water comes from two separate and reliable sources of filtered water, and the tanks must together hold double the capacity required, each of them covering 100% of the calculated requirement on its own.
- The fire protection designer comes under examination. The expert who draws up, checks and endorses the technical design needs a practice permit issued by CNCAN: engineering studies in the field, at least 5 years of experience in design and technical checking, of which at least 2 years on nuclear-specific buildings and installations, then written tests, a practical test on a real design and an interview, with a minimum of 70% in each test. The permit is issued for 3 years on first authorisation and for 5 years on renewal, only for the types of installation examined and only for the organisation of the licensee, that is of the holder of the CNCAN authorisation.
- A single calendar deadline in the whole act: 26 October 2027. By then, licensees for nuclear installations in operation must send CNCAN the analysis of compliance with the new requirements and the action plan for implementing them in full. For the implementation of the improvements itself, the act fixes no date at all: Article 143 asks only that they be put in place „in due time”.
Published: Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 893 of 26 October 2026, page 2, with the annex in no. 893 bis of 26 October 2026, pages 3-94
In force from: 26 October 2026, on the date of publication, since the order does not provide for a later date
From 26 October 2026, every nuclear installation in Romania is required to begin intervention on a fire within no more than 15 minutes of detection, and the systems on which nuclear safety depends must be separated from the rest of the installation by barriers that resist fire for at least 3 hours. The two figures appear for the first time in a Romanian nuclear safety norm and are part of the 92 pages approved by Order no. 162/2026 of the President of the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control. The norms do not concern only the Cernavodă plant: they also cover the nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the spent fuel stores, the radioactive waste stores, uranium mining and the state research reactors, whose 2026 budget was approved two weeks earlier.
The order itself takes up a single page and has three articles. Article 1 approves the norms, set out in the annex published separately, in edition 893 bis. Article 2 repeals the Norms on the protection of nuclear power plants against internal fires and explosions, approved by Order no. 141/2006 of the President of the same commission and published on 9 June 2006. Article 3 orders publication. The order was signed on 16 October 2026, the same day the supporting note no. 12.449 that gives its reasons was drawn up, and reached the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, ten days later.
The old norms addressed a single type of facility, the nuclear power plant unit, and covered only internal fires and explosions. The new ones start from a different place: Article 1 states that they lay down the general nuclear safety requirements for the protection of nuclear installations against fires and explosions, while Article 2 extends application across thirteen entries, from nuclear power plants „including those equipped with modular reactors” to detritiation facilities and nuclear-specific constructions. For the different categories and types of installation, application follows „a graded approach”, according to the risks of each, so a research reactor does not get the same treatment as a power plant.
The central instrument of the norms is the fire hazard analysis, abbreviated API throughout the Romanian text. It is drawn up at the design stage, updated before commissioning and, at reactors, before the first loading of nuclear fuel into the core. Over the lifetime of the installation, the API is revised at least once every 5 years and every time a change of design or of operation alters the level or the location of the hazards. Fire protection as a whole is reviewed at least once every 10 years, to bring it into line with the most recent international standards, and the list of standards, codes and guides used is likewise updated at least every 10 years.
The API does not remain a desk document. Article 21 requires that the assumptions about the availability of the teams and about the time from the detection of the fire to the successful completion of the intervention be justified, verified and validated through practical exercises simulating the manoeuvres in the installation. For every area where the analyses credit manual extinguishing, the minimum number of qualified staff, the intervention equipment and the operational times must be set and validated in the field. And for nuclear power plants and demonstration reactors, two further analyses are mandatory alongside the API: one demonstrating that the reactor can be brought to a safe shutdown state and held there after a fire, over the long term, and the Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic nuclear safety assessment for fire events.
One sentence in Article 11 changes the tone of the whole regulation: the design of fire protection „may not be restricted on economic grounds”. It is matched by Article 9, which lists the functions that must be maintained during and after any fire: reactivity control, including shutting the reactor down and keeping it safely shut down for an indefinite period, cooling the nuclear fuel, in the reactor and in the spent fuel stores, confining radioactive materials and monitoring the state of the installation, with the support services needed, from electrical power to instrument air.
What it changes in practice
For licensees, the immediate effect is a list of obligations checked at authorisation, not at a routine inspection. Authorisation of fire safety is no longer a separate file: Article 141 makes it an integral part of the design, siting, construction and assembly, commissioning, operation and decommissioning authorisations. Without the API documentation, in its preliminary stage, the construction authorisation is not issued, and without an updated API the commissioning authorisation is not issued.
Two requirements move the moment at which protection has to exist. All detection and alarm systems must be fully operational before the first nuclear fuel or the first radioactive materials arrive on the site, and at installations with a reactor all extinguishing systems must be fully available before the initial fuel loading. For projects in preparation, including those with modular reactors, this means that fire protection becomes a condition of the schedule, not an item completed in parallel with commissioning.
Every fire compartment or fire cell must be covered by a reliable automatic detection system, with an alarm that shows the location of the fire. The systems must be addressable, must report the event quickly in the main control room, must be fed from uninterruptible power supplies and must have fire-resistant cables, and connection faults are signalled in the control room as well. The only way out is a demonstration, based on the API, that such a system is not necessary or is not practicable in a particular area, with adequate alternative measures.
The fire water supply gets precise sizing requirements. Two separate and reliable sources of filtered water are needed, unless a single source is large enough, such as a lake or a river, and has two independent intakes. Where tanks are used, they must together hold double the capacity required by the API, each must be able to provide 100% of the requirement on its own, they must be interconnected so that the pumps can draw from either or from both, and each must be capable of being isolated in the event of a fault. Distribution is through a ring main, fed from both directions, and every building must have at least two connections to it.
In operation, the norms go into day-to-day detail. Non-essential combustible materials are not allowed in the vicinity of systems important to nuclear safety and of their cables, nor in the main and secondary control rooms. Transient combustible material, packaging in particular, is removed immediately after the activity ends. For every area and every compartment, records must be kept of the existing fire load and of the maximum permissible fire load, and hot work is carried out under permit, with a prior assessment of its effect on fire protection and, where needed, under continuous watch.
For the people living around a site, the effect reads indirectly, through what exactly has to hold. Fire protection is tied explicitly to the radiological protection of staff, of the population and of the environment, and hazards coming from outside the installation, from neighbouring facilities, industrial activities, transport routes, stores or vegetation, must be identified, assessed and reduced to the practicable minimum through siting, separation distances and barriers. For installations with reactors and for interim spent fuel stores, the licensee must have a response strategy for the accidental crash of an aircraft on the site, including for the fires that would follow.
What has changed compared with the previous situation
Until 26 October 2026 the Norms on the protection of nuclear power plants against internal fires and explosions applied, with 149 articles in nine chapters and three annexes. The new norms have 146 articles in ten chapters and three annexes, three articles fewer, but they cover thirteen categories of installation instead of one. The difference does not come from concision: Chapter V, the one on defence in depth, has grown to six sections and twenty paragraphs, and the subject matter that was missing altogether in 2006 has been added.
The biggest change of substance is the scope. The old regulation addressed the holder of the authorisation for a nuclear power plant unit. The new one catches research, test and zero-power reactors and subcritical assemblies, demonstration reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication plants, spent fuel stores, enrichment and reprocessing facilities, the radioactive waste stores and treatment facilities located on the same site, detritiation facilities, the mining and milling of uranium and thorium ores and nuclear-specific constructions. Plants with modular reactors are named explicitly, four times in the text, although none is yet in operation in Romania.
The second change is the arrival of figures. The old norms spoke of a „sufficient” response time and left the fire resistance of the barriers to the hazard analysis and to the applicable technical regulations. The new ones fix 15 minutes as an absolute ceiling for the start of intervention and 3 hours as the minimum fire resistance of the barriers between systems with nuclear safety functions and the rest of the installations, with an obligation to justify any exception. The same bracket holds the double capacity of the fire water tanks and the two connections required per building.
The third change concerns people, not installations. In 2006 there was no requirement for an individual permit for fire protection designers; responsibility fell on the design organisation, which had to be experienced and accepted. Article 110 of the new norms introduces the practice permit issued by CNCAN for the expert who draws up, checks and endorses the technical design, with an examination in three tests and a minimum mark of 70% in each. The same regime applies, by reference, to the persons appointed to oversee the implementation of the operational requirements, at least one for each nuclear installation and at least one for the whole site.
Finally, the annexes have been rearranged. Annex no. 1 remains the one with definitions, but it is far longer. Annex no. 2 is no longer the list of related normative acts, but a list of twelve international reference documents, from the International Atomic Energy Agency guides SSG-64 and SSG-77 to the reference levels of the association of Western European nuclear regulators, the Canadian standards CSA N293 and N393 and the American guide RG no. 1.189. Annex no. 3 holds the minimum content of the fire protection programme, which in 2006 was Annex no. 2.
Advantages and disadvantages
What it improves
- The 15-minute ceiling turns a judgement call into a verifiable obligation. An inspector can time it during an exercise; „sufficient response time” could not be timed.
- The rule now applies to all nuclear installations, not only to the power plant. Until 26 October 2026, the spent fuel stores, the fuel fabrication plant, the detritiation facilities and uranium mining had only the general fire safety legislation.
- Fire protection becomes a condition of authorisation at every stage, including at design, so it is checked before the concrete is poured, not afterwards.
- The requirement that the detection systems be operational before the fuel is brought on site, and the extinguishing systems before the first loading, closes a window of risk that was in practice the longest one.
- Article 11 takes cost out of the technical discussion: fire protection „may not be restricted on economic grounds”.
- The examination for the practice permit includes a practical test on a real design, in the presence of CNCAN representatives, and may include a field inspection to check that the installed design matches the documentation. It is not a memory test.
- Annex no. 2 puts the international reference documents on the table, with title and year, so the licensee knows what it is being measured against, and anyone can check whether the Romanian norm has fallen behind.
What remains a problem
- The only calendar deadline in the act, 26 October 2027, applies to a report and a plan, not to a physical measure. Implementation of the improvements is left at „in due time”.
- The obligation to report on compliance falls only on installations in operation. Those under construction or being commissioned on the date of entry into force have no reporting deadline at all, although Article 143 includes them in the transitional regime.
- CNCAN sets itself no deadline for assessing the report it asks for. In 92 pages there is not a single deadline for the authority.
- The practice permit is issued only for the licensee’s own staff and only for its organisation, although design work is usually contracted out. For the expert of a design firm, the norm opens no route.
- The permit regime enters into force together with the rest of the norms, with no transition period, although the permit it requires is created by this very act and nobody could hold one on 26 October 2026.
- The word „interne”, internal, has remained in three places in the new text, inherited from the title of the 2006 norms, and it conflicts with the obligation to cover external hazards as well.
- The norms require fires on the site to be recorded and analysed, but they set no deadline and no obligation of their own to notify CNCAN. Reporting is left to „the regulations in force”, which the act does not name.
Practical advice
- If you are the licensee of a nuclear installation in operation, the date you count from is 26 October 2026, and the deadline falls on 26 October 2027. The report required by Article 144 has two distinct parts, the compliance analysis and the action plan, and the absence of either means the deadline has been missed.
- Start with an article-by-article inventory, not with a global assessment. The requirements with a figure, the 15 minutes, the 3 hours, the double tank capacity, the two connections per building, automatic detection in every compartment, can be checked quickly and show by themselves where an investment plan is needed.
- Check whether your API is less than 5 years old. If it is not, the revision is due regardless of the new norms, and an expired API makes it impossible to justify any of the exceptions the norms allow „on the basis of the API”.
- If you are an engineer and want to work on fire protection designs in the nuclear field, the entry conditions are 5 years of experience in design and technical checking, of which 2 on nuclear-specific buildings and installations. The examination methodology is built on Order no. 149/2021 of the President of CNCAN and on Order no. 61/2014, so that is where the rules on the application file are to be read.
- Bear in mind that the permit is tied to the type of installation and to the organisation. Extending it to another type of installation calls for a fresh examination, and the right acquired is not transferred without the agreement of CNCAN.
- When a requirement of the nuclear norms cannot be applied at the same time as the general fire safety legislation, do not decide on your own. Article 145 requires CNCAN to be informed in writing and the application of Article 28(5) of Law no. 111/1996 to be requested, which gives priority to the conditions for carrying out nuclear activities safely.
- For decommissioning, the fire protection programme is prepared at least 6 months before activities actually begin, and the hydrant system must stay in service until the last stage is completed.
Frequently asked questions
When do the new norms enter into force?
Who exactly do they concern?
Why do modular reactors appear in the norm if Romania has none?
What do the 15 minutes mean?
Can an external designer obtain the practice permit?
What happens if a licensee does not comply?
Where can the full text be read?
Errors and inconsistencies in the published text
- Annex, Article 4(2), Article 5(9) and Article 5(10): the word „interne”, internal, narrows the object of the protection programme and of the mandatory analyses, in contradiction with four other provisions of the same act. Article 4(1) requires the licensee to implement „un program de protecție împotriva incendiilor și exploziilor”, a programme for protection against fires and explosions, with no qualifier, while paragraph (5) requires that programme to provide also for „protecția împotriva evenimentelor de pe amplasamentul instalației nucleare sau din vecinătatea acestuia care pot cauza incendii și explozii”, protection against events on the site of the nuclear installation or in its vicinity which may cause fires and explosions. Paragraph (2), which alone establishes for which systems, structures, components and equipment the programme is set up, nevertheless calls it „programul de protecție împotriva incendiilor și exploziilor interne”, the programme for protection against internal fires and explosions. In the same way, Article 5(9) announces „următoarele analize și evaluări privind securitatea la incendiu și explozii interne”, the following analyses and assessments concerning safety against internal fires and explosions, and immediately lists, at point (a), „analiza deterministă a pericolelor interne și externe de incendii și explozii”, the deterministic analysis of internal and external fire and explosion hazards, while paragraph (10) returns to „securitatea la incendiu și explozii interne”, safety against internal fires and explosions. Article 1(2), the title of the norms and Article 10(11), which requires the identification of hazards coming from neighbouring facilities, transport routes, stores and vegetation, all run the other way. A licensee acting in good faith may conclude either that the programme submitted for CNCAN approval covers only internal hazards, or that it covers external ones as well, and what goes into the authorisation documentation depends on that choice. The word has a history: the title of the repealed norms, approved by Order no. 141/2006, was „privind protecția centralelor nuclearoelectrice împotriva incendiilor și exploziilor interne”, on the protection of nuclear power plants against internal fires and explosions, and the new norms removed „interne” from the title and from Article 1 but left it in these three places. The contradiction is the more visible because Article 4(6) expressly regulates the prevention of explosions inside systems and equipment too, subject matter that the 2006 norm excluded.
- Annex no. 1, the paragraph following the definition of „Riscul de incendiu”, fire risk: a definition text with no term defined. The annex is built uniformly, with the term in bold followed by a dash and by the definition. Between the definition of fire risk and that of fire load there appears a paragraph of its own, which begins with a lower-case letter and has no term in front of it: „starea exprimată prin relația de interdependență între probabilitatea globală de inițiere a unui incendiu și gravitatea consecințelor evenimentului respectiv; de regulă, relația este exprimată prin produsul celor doi factori”, the state expressed by the relationship of interdependence between the overall probability of a fire starting and the severity of the consequences of that event; as a rule, the relationship is expressed as the product of the two factors. The reader cannot establish whether this is a second definition of fire risk, in which case the risk is „the product” of frequency and severity under the first definition but only „as a rule” the product under the second, or whether it is the definition of another term whose name is missing from the annex. The choice is not theoretical: fire risk is the quantity on which the fire hazard analysis and the Level 1 and Level 2 probabilistic assessments required by Article 21 are built. The check was made on page 91 of edition no. 893 bis, on the fonts and the positions of each fragment of text: every other term in the annex has its name set in bold, this paragraph has none, and on the pages of the norms there is no image in which the name might have been set graphically.
Editorial analysis
The act settles an old backlog and settles it well. The regulation it replaces stayed in force for 7,444 days, that is 20 years and four months, and stopped at a single type of facility, the nuclear power plant unit, over a period in which Romania added an interim spent fuel store, carried the project for units 3 and 4 forward and started a modular reactor project. The new norms cover thirteen entries, introduce the first numerical ceilings in the field and make the authorisation of fire safety an integral part of every stage authorisation. On substance, this brings Romania into line with the international standards that Annex no. 2 lists by name, with title and year, something few Romanian norms do.
What does not show when the act is read end to end is the arithmetic of its deadlines. In 92 pages and 146 articles there is exactly one calendar deadline, the one-year deadline in Article 144, which expires on 26 October 2027, and one relative deadline, the 6 months before decommissioning in Article 137. Both concern documents: a report with the compliance analysis plus an action plan, and a fire protection programme respectively. No physical measure has a date. Article 143 requires the design requirements to be used „as a reference for the timely implementation of nuclear safety improvements that are reasonably practicable”, a formula that leaves the schedule open to negotiation, and Article 11, which forbids any restriction of protection on economic grounds, cannot bite without a reference date. On the other side, CNCAN imposes no deadline on itself: the report is sent „for assessment”, with no date by which the assessment is to be ready and no consequence if it is late. The ratio between the deadlines of the two parties is therefore 365 days for the addressee and no deadline at all for the authority.
The second observation comes from putting Article 110 together with Article 143. The norms create a practice permit that did not exist on 25 October 2026 and that they require from 26 October 2026, with no transitional provision: the transitional regime in Chapter X deals with the design requirements and the compliance report, not with the qualification of persons. On the day of entry into force there was no person holding the permit, because the examination is conducted by CNCAN representatives under a methodology which, under Article 110(1)(b), must comply with Order no. 149/2021 of the President of CNCAN and with Order no. 61/2014, and therefore itself presupposes an adaptation. Further, the same point (b) refers to a norm concerning „the staff of the organisations responsible for the design, siting, construction and assembly” of nuclear installations, while paragraph (1) speaks only of „the licensee’s own staff”, and point (i) ties the permit to the licensee’s organisation. Fire protection design for nuclear installations is done in Romania, as everywhere, by specialised firms; the norm leaves them outside the regime it has just created.
The third observation concerns the asymmetry of the validity periods. The permit is issued for 3 years on first authorisation and for 5 years on renewal, with a minimum mark of 70% in each test. The fire hazard analysis is revised at least once every 5 years, and fire protection as a whole at least once every 10 years. An expert authorised for the first time therefore goes through two examinations in the interval in which his installation carries out a single API revision, and does not even reach the halfway point of the ten-year review cycle. Conversely, only two permit renewals fit between two ten-year reviews, at three and at eight years, so the person is requalified more often than the object he works on is reassessed. If the purpose of the permit is for the design to keep pace with the standards, then the cadence of examining persons and the cadence of reviewing the installation ought to be read together, not set separately.
What should be changed
- Removing the word „interne”, internal, from Article 4(2), from Article 5(9) and from Article 5(10). The correction is one word in three places, but the practical effect is that the authorisation documentation for the protection programme would include, beyond argument, the external hazards on the site and in its vicinity, which Article 10(11) requires in any case. As things stand, a licensee can submit a programme limited to internal hazards and can invoke the text of Article 4(2) in support of it.
- Completing Annex no. 1 with the missing term or deleting the orphan paragraph. If the text is a second definition of fire risk, one of the two has to go, because the first defines it categorically as a product and the second only „as a rule” as a product. If it is the definition of another term, its name has to be added. The effect is direct on the fire hazard analysis: a licensee would know whether it is obliged to express risk as a product or whether it may use another relationship, with justification.
- A deadline for implementing the improvements and the inclusion of construction sites in the reporting obligation. It would be enough for Article 144 to require, alongside the action plan, a completion date for each action, approved by CNCAN together with the assessment of the report, and to extend the obligation to installations under construction or being commissioned, which Article 143 already includes in the transitional regime. The 365 days would then not be spent on a document, and „in due time” in Article 143 would acquire measurable content. For a nuclear construction site, the compliance analysis is more useful than for an installation that has been running for decades, because there design changes are still possible without a shutdown.
- An assessment deadline for CNCAN. A new paragraph in Article 144, with 90 or 120 days from receipt of the report for communicating the result of the assessment, would balance the ratio of 365 days to zero. Without it, a licensee that has filed its report on time can be left with the plan unapproved indefinitely, and the delay cannot be laid at anyone’s door.
- Extending the permit regime to the experts of design organisations and a transition period for the first examinations. Article 110(1) ought to cover the staff of the organisations contracted to draw up and check the design, as the norm it itself refers to does, and a transitional provision of 12 or 18 months would allow designs in progress to be signed lawfully until the first examination session. Without that, a requirement that has to be met from 26 October 2026 could not be met by anyone on that day.
- A dedicated deadline for notifying fires to CNCAN. Article 135 requires detailed recording and analysis of events on the site that concern fire protection, „in accordance with the regulations in force”, without naming them and without any deadline. An express reference to the norm on event reporting, with the applicable deadline, would make the difference between an internal file and informing the authority in real time, which is the only way operating experience ends up changing anything at the other installations.
Original text of the legal act
The text below is reproduced in Romanian, the official form of publication.
The full text, as published in the Official Gazette of Romania
Official Gazette of Romania no. 893 of 26 October 2026, page 2, with the annex in no. 893 bis of 26 October 2026, pages 3-94 16 pages PDF, 103 KB the act starts on page 2
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