In brief

  • A temporary closure made of ballasted barges and pontoons is being installed on the canal that carries water to the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant, across a section of roughly 170 metres, and high-capacity pumps must bring into the plant’s distribution basin an additional flow of at least 6.5 cubic metres per second, that is around 561,600 cubic metres in a single day.
  • The figure that triggers the restrictions is the 1.58 m dMB level measured at Cernavodă, the reading on the local gauge referred to the national levelling datum. Once the water falls that far, navigation and lockage on the Danube-Black Sea Canal and on the affected stretches of the Old Danube are restricted or stopped, without delay. The decision states expressly that this threshold does not change the plant’s operating limits or its nuclear safety requirements.
  • The measures approved in September by CNSU Decision no. 22/2026 stop, including those already under way, and are replaced by the new temporary system. The act was adopted on 8 October 2026 and published on 9 October 2026, during the state of alert declared by CNSU Decision no. 15/2026 and extended twice, by Decisions no. 21/2026 and no. 23/2026.
Act: Decision of the National Committee for Emergency Situations no. 24/2026 establishing staged operational measures to secure the flows and levels required by the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant
Published: Official Gazette of Romania (Monitorul Oficial), Part I, no. 850 of 9 October 2026, pages 14-16
In force from: 9 October 2026, the date of publication. The decision sets no other date: Article 10 provides only for its publication and for its communication to all components of the National Emergency Management System

The National Committee for Emergency Situations (CNSU) has approved a temporary damming and pumping system on the link canal to the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant, the only nuclear power station in Romania. Decision no. 24/2026, published on 9 October 2026, starts from two technical reports by the National Administration „Apele Române”, of 9 September and 22 September 2026, and from the weather forecasts for 5 October to 2 November 2026, according to which temperatures will run above normal and rainfall will be in deficit across the Danube river basin. It is the fourth act by which the committee has intervened on this subject during the state of alert for energy, after Decisions no. 16, no. 17, no. 20 and no. 22 of 2026.

The underlying problem, as the decision describes it, is that the Old Danube can no longer carry enough water towards the Cernavodă area: the shape of the bed and the shallow sills limit the flow, while the hydrological forecasts show levels recovering slowly, with no return to a comfortable regime. A nuclear power plant needs a steady stream of cold water, which it draws from a distribution basin fed by the canal. If the level drops, the quantity entering the basin drops with it, and the committee preferred to prepare a mechanically delivered reserve of water in good time rather than wait for the moment when the level reaches the threshold.

The solution chosen has two components. The first is a modular closure of the diversion canal, built up progressively from ballasted barges and a lighter and from pontoons, across a cross section of roughly 170 metres. The second is a set of high-capacity pumps, sized to transfer into the plant’s distribution basin an additional flow of at least 6.5 cubic metres per second. The motor pumps come from the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, through the Department for Emergency Situations, while commissioning and maintenance fall to the National Administration „Apele Române”, together with Nuclearelectrica, the Navigable Canals Administration and the Ministry of National Defence. The fuel for the pumps, the motor pumps and the dredgers is provided by the plant.

The decision is signed by Prime Minister Ilie-Gavril Bolojan, as chairman of the committee, on 8 October 2026, and rests on Government Emergency Ordinance no. 21/2004 on the National Emergency Management System, approved by Law no. 15/2005, together with point 17 of Annex no. 1 to Government Decision no. 557/2016 on the management of risk types.

What it changes in practice

For navigation, the effect is the most direct one. When the 1.58 m dMB level is reached at Cernavodă, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, through the Navigable Canals Administration, the Lower Danube River Administration Galați and the Romanian Naval Authority, orders navigation and lockage on the Danube-Black Sea Canal and on the stretches of the Old Danube affected by the works to be restricted or temporarily suspended. The procedures and the notices required are to be prepared before the threshold is reached, precisely so that activation does not wait on paperwork. The structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Romanian Naval Authority may restrict river traffic in the working areas and may require anchored vessels to be moved.

For the public budget, the decision opens three distinct funding streams. The costs borne by the National Administration „Apele Române” for the modular closure and for the pumping are covered first from its own resources, under chapter 70.04, title 20, budget article 20.22 „Finanțarea acțiunilor din domeniul apelor”, the funding of action in the water sector, and are then borne by the state budget through the budget of the Ministry of Environment, Waters and Forests, which is to be increased, with the administration’s own revenue replenished by those amounts. The costs of the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations are covered by supplementing the 2026 budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the Budget Reserve Fund at the Government’s disposal. The deepening dredging on the Cernavodă to Caragheorghe-Turcescu sector is paid for by the Lower Danube River Administration Galați, from its own budgets and from the other resources made available by the ministry.

For the power system, the decision also calls on the hydropower plants. The Ministry of Energy, through Hidroelectrica, is to increase the flows discharged into the Danube during the critical period by roughly 50 to 100 cubic metres per second, in cases of force majeure and depending on what the reservoirs hold, under the operating programme updated together with the National Administration „Apele Române”.

For procurement, the works move into an emergency regime. The decision refers expressly to Law no. 98/2016 on public procurement, including the provisions applicable to force majeure and extreme urgency, but only in so far as the conditions laid down by that law are met. The wording confirms that the procedures already in place for urgent action are the ones to be used, without adding a new exception.

What the decision does not do matters just as much. Article 2 defines, in paragraph (5), the 1.58 m dMB level as a preventive operational threshold for triggering the hydraulic measures and the logistical mobilisation, and adds that it does not change the limits, the operating conditions, the nuclear safety requirements or the obligations set out in the authorisations and the regulations applicable to the plant. In other words, the threshold is a signal for the water administration and for transport, not a reactor safety threshold, and the decision says nothing about cutting or stopping generation.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

Article 1 closes the previous regime: the measures laid down in Article 2 of CNSU Decision no. 22/2026, whether already being implemented or due to be triggered on the reaching of certain thresholds or on the fulfilment of certain conditions, cease to be implemented or do not start at all. This is a complete replacement of the technical package, not an addition to it.

What changes in the logic of the intervention is the architecture itself. Decision no. 22/2026 tied activation to pre-set thresholds and conditions, while the new decision shifts the emphasis onto a temporary, modular and reversible structure, installed progressively on the basis of an operational technical plan drawn up by the National Administration „Apele Române” together with the plant and the Lower Danube River Administration Galați. The plan sets the position, the draught, the distances between the hulls, the mooring systems, the free flow sections and the order of placement, after bathymetry, velocities, hydrodynamic loads, stability and the risk of scour, that is of the bed being dug out around the floating hulls, have been checked.

There is also a withdrawal condition that the previous act did not have written in this form. Demobilisation of the damming and pumping system is triggered at the plant’s request, and only if four conditions are met cumulatively: the forecast shows a sustainable rise in levels for at least 72 hours, the level measured at Cernavodă confirms that the critical zone has been left behind, the measurements upstream and downstream of the ballasted platforms show no adverse hydraulic or morphological effects, and the natural inflow together with the operating manoeuvres can maintain the supply without pumping.

A third new element is the independent hydraulic reserve described in the preamble: the pumping resources of the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations and of the National Administration „Apele Române” are combined with each other and supplemented by a temporary manoeuvre transferring water from the Danube-Black Sea Canal. In short, part of the water in the shipping canal is turned back towards the plant, and that is where the price paid by navigation comes from.

Advantages and disadvantages

What it improves

  • The threshold is a figure, not a judgement call. The 1.58 m dMB level is measured at Cernavodă and can be checked, and the navigation restrictions are tied to it, not to an assessment made on the spot.
  • Preparation happens before the threshold. Article 3(2) requires the procedures and the notices for stopping navigation to be ready in advance, and Article 9 requires the logistical and administrative preparation of all the intervention steps at the same time.
  • The solution is reversible. The barges, the lighter and the pontoons are placed progressively and can be withdrawn, and the act lists the demobilisation conditions, including the duty to check whether the installation has caused adverse morphological effects.
  • Funding is indicated with chapter, title and budget article, and the replenishment of the water administration’s own revenue is provided for expressly, not left to a later act.
  • The legal limit of the threshold is written into the act. Paragraph (5) of Article 2 rules out from the start any reading under which 1.58 m would be a nuclear safety threshold.

What remains a problem

  • The decision announces staged measures and refers to the „hydrometric thresholds” in the plural, in Article 9, yet it sets a single figure, the 1.58 m dMB level. The stages, and the thresholds that separate them, cannot be seen from the act.
  • None of the ten articles provides for any reporting: nobody owes the committee a periodic update on the level measured, on the flow actually pumped or on the stage reached.
  • The operational technical plan under Article 2(6), on which the placing of the barges depends, has no deadline for being drawn up and is not published.
  • The stopping of navigation on the Danube-Black Sea Canal has no maximum duration and comes with no provision at all about the transport operations affected.
  • The dredging on the Cernavodă to Caragheorghe-Turcescu sector continues „until the depths are evened out”, with no target depth and no deadline, so with no criterion by which the work can be seen to have finished.

Practical advice

  1. If you have cargo scheduled on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, follow the notices issued by the Navigable Canals Administration and the Romanian Naval Authority, not just the Danube levels. The restrictions switch on when the 1.58 m dMB level is reached, and the decision requires the notices to be prepared in advance, so the announcement may come on the same day.
  2. In the river transport contracts concluded for the autumn of 2026, include a clause on the restriction or the suspension of navigation ordered by the authority. The act provides for no maximum duration for a stoppage and for no compensation.
  3. If you have a vessel anchored in the Cernavodă area, prepare a relocation option. Article 4(1) allows the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Romanian Naval Authority to restrict and, where appropriate, to relocate vessels anchored in the intervention areas.
  4. Hydraulic works firms, shipping companies and pump rental companies may be approached under an emergency procedure. Procurement is carried out under Law no. 98/2016, including through the provisions on force majeure and extreme urgency, but only where the conditions of the law are met, so ask from the outset for the document that justifies the procedure chosen.
  5. Do not read the 1.58 m dMB level as a signal about the safety of the plant. The act calls it a preventive operational threshold and states that it does not change the nuclear safety requirements, and information about how the reactors are running comes from the operator and from the nuclear regulator, not from this act.

Frequently asked questions

What exactly happens when the level reaches 1.58 m dMB?
Navigation and lockage on the Danube-Black Sea Canal and on the stretches of the Old Danube affected by the works are stopped or restricted. The measure is ordered by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, through the Navigable Canals Administration, the Lower Danube River Administration Galați and the Romanian Naval Authority, each within its own powers, and it must be applied without delay.
Does the Cernavodă plant shut down if the level drops?
The act does not say so and it does not set operating thresholds for the reactors either. Under paragraph (5) of Article 2, the 1.58 m dMB level is defined as a preventive operational threshold, for triggering the hydraulic measures and the logistical mobilisation, and the text adds that it does not change the limits, the operating conditions, the nuclear safety requirements or the obligations under the plant’s authorisations.
How much does the system have to pump?
At least 6.5 cubic metres per second in addition, transferred into the plant’s distribution basin. Over a full day of continuous running, that comes to around 561,600 cubic metres of water.
Who pays for the intervention?
The water administration’s works are financed first from its own resources, then borne by the state budget through the budget of the Ministry of Environment, Waters and Forests, which is to be increased, with the amounts replenishing its own revenue. The costs of the General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations are covered by supplementing the 2026 budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the Budget Reserve Fund at the Government’s disposal. The dredging is paid for by the Lower Danube River Administration Galați from its own budgets.
When are the barges removed and navigation resumed?
Demobilisation of the damming and pumping system is triggered at the plant’s request, if four conditions are met cumulatively: a forecast of a sustainable rise in levels for at least 72 hours, a measured level confirming that the critical zone has been left behind, measurements upstream and downstream showing no adverse effects, and the possibility of maintaining the supply without pumping. Separately, Article 3(3) says that the resumption of navigation and the withdrawal of the temporary elements are to be carried out in stages, once a sufficient hydraulic margin and a stable hydrological trend have been established.
From when does the decision apply?
From 9 October 2026, the date of publication in the Official Gazette of Romania. The act was adopted on 8 October 2026 and sets no other date of entry into force, and Article 10 provides for its publication and its communication to all components of the National Emergency Management System, which put it into effect through their own orders and administrative acts.
What happened to the measures approved earlier?
Article 1 provides that the measures laid down in Article 2 of CNSU Decision no. 22/2026 cease to be implemented or, as the case may be, do not start at all, including those that were to be triggered on the reaching of certain thresholds or on the fulfilment of certain conditions.

Errors and inconsistencies in the published text

  • Article 2, paragraphs (4) and (5): two different answers to the question of what triggers mobilisation. Paragraph (5) defines the 1.58 m dMB level as a „prag operativ preventiv pentru declanșarea măsurilor hidraulice și de mobilizare logistică”, a preventive operational threshold for triggering the hydraulic measures and the logistical mobilisation, so it ties activation to a measured figure. Paragraph (4) says that the intervention system, „inclusiv componentele de pompare”, including the pumping components, is mobilised „la solicitarea CNE Cernavodă”, at the request of the Cernavodă plant, so it ties activation to a request. A reader in good faith may conclude either that the water administration must begin mobilising the moment the level reaches the threshold, or that nothing begins until the plant’s request arrives, however low the level may be. That the difference is real can be seen from Article 3(1), where the same threshold is written as an automatic trigger, with no request, for restricting navigation. The text ought to say expressly which of the two is the condition for mobilisation and, if the request remains, how soon after the threshold is reached it must be sent.
  • Article 2(7) against Article 3(3): two tests for withdrawing the same installation. The first text provides that demobilisation of the damming and pumping system is triggered at the plant’s request and only if four conditions are met cumulatively, among them a forecast of a sustainable rise in levels for at least 72 hours. The other text lays down, for the „retragerea ori reconfigurarea elementelor temporare”, the withdrawal or reconfiguration of the temporary elements, a far broader test, „constatarea unei marje hidraulice suficiente și a unei tendințe hidrologice stabile”, a finding that there is a sufficient hydraulic margin and a stable hydrological trend, with no request from the plant, without the 72 hours and without the measurements upstream and downstream. The temporary elements are the same barges, lighters and pontoons that Article 2 speaks of, and Article 5 uses the expression for the same installation. The result is that withdrawing the dam can be justified either on four cumulative conditions or on a general finding, which changes both who takes the decision and the point from which the plant’s water supply installation may be taken apart. An express reference in Article 3(3) to the conditions in Article 2(7) would close the gap.

Editorial analysis

The decision solves a real problem and solves it in advance, which does not happen often: it requires the resources, the access routes, the materials and the notices to be ready before the critical thresholds are reached, not afterwards. The technical part is written by people who have seen the canal: draught, mooring, free flow sections, scour risk, measurements upstream and downstream. On governance, however, the act is unusually thin for what is at stake, and the asymmetry shows up by simple counting. Those who have to carry it out are held to the words „without delay” twice, in Article 3(1) and (2), and the plant is given a continuing obligation, to supply the fuel for the pumps, the motor pumps and the dredgers, under Article 2(8). In return, across all ten articles there is not a single calendar deadline and not a single duty to report: the operational technical plan under Article 2(6) has no delivery date, the dredging under Article 3(4) runs „until the depths are evened out”, with no target depth, and the committee that adopted the decision does not reserve the right to receive any information about what happens on the canal.

The two flows in the act are worth putting side by side, because the comparison does not emerge from reading it. The pumping has to deliver at least 6.5 cubic metres per second, that is roughly 23,400 cubic metres an hour and 561,600 cubic metres in a day of continuous running. The increase required of Hidroelectrica by Article 6, of roughly 50 to 100 cubic metres per second, is 7.7 to 15.4 times larger. The difference explains the architecture: water released from the reservoirs goes off into the river and arrives diluted and delayed, whereas pumping puts water straight into the plant’s distribution basin. That is precisely why the mechanical reserve, small though it is on the scale of the Danube, is the piece on which continuity depends, and why the absence of any reporting on the flow actually pumped is all the harder to explain.

The second observation that requires two provisions to be read together concerns the interval in which nothing happens. Article 1 stops, from 9 October 2026, the measures under Article 2 of CNSU Decision no. 22/2026, including those already being implemented. The new system, on the other hand, is mobilised only „at the request of CNE Cernavodă”, under Article 2(4). Between those two moments the act leaves no active hydraulic measure on the ground, only the duty of preparation under Article 9. How long that interval lasts depends on nothing written in the decision, and this within a forecast window, 5 October to 2 November 2026, of 29 days, which had already begun four days before publication.

Then there is the calendar, which says something of its own. The most recent technical report invoked in the preamble is from 22 September 2026, that is 16 days before the decision was adopted, and the first is from 9 September, 13 days before the second. For an act that builds its entire logic on measured levels and on hydraulic effects confirmed after each stage, the lag shows that the decision was taken on a snapshot two and a half weeks old. And the forecast window ends on 2 November 2026, while the state of alert, already extended twice by Decisions no. 21/2026 and no. 23/2026, has no expiry date anywhere in this act. If the alert ends before the critical zone has been left behind, the decision does not say what happens to the barges already installed and to the navigation already stopped, because the only withdrawal mechanism it provides starts from hydrological levels, not from the end of the state of alert.

What should be changed

  • A single trigger for mobilisation. If reaching the 1.58 m dMB level makes mobilisation compulsory, Article 2(4) ought to say so, and the plant’s request ought to become a formality with a short deadline. In practice, that would do away with the interval in which the level is below the threshold yet nobody is obliged to begin, because the request has not come.
  • An express link between the two withdrawal tests. Article 3(3) ought to take over the cumulative conditions from Article 2(7). The practical effect is that the plant’s water supply installation could not be taken apart on a general appraisal of „sufficient hydraulic margin”, but only after the 72-hour forecast and after the measurements upstream and downstream.
  • The stages and their thresholds, written into the act. The decision announces staged measures and speaks in Article 9 of the „hydrometric thresholds”, yet it sets a single figure. Two or three successive levels, each with the stage it triggers, would make staging verifiable and would show the public and the transport operators how far there is to go before navigation stops.
  • Reporting to the committee at a fixed interval. The National Administration „Apele Române” and the plant ought to report weekly, and daily on pumping days, the level measured, the flow actually transferred and the stage reached. Without that, the committee has no way of deciding to move to the next stage, or to end the measures, other than on a request coming from the operator.
  • A clause on the end of the state of alert. The act ought to say what happens to the temporary installation and to the navigation restrictions if the state of alert ends before the demobilisation conditions are met. Otherwise, when the alert ends, a dam of roughly 170 metres and a navigation stoppage with no active legal basis are left on the ground.
  • A target depth for the dredging. The formula „until the depths are evened out” in Article 3(4) ought to be replaced by a depth expressed in metres and by a deadline. Without them, neither the funder nor the public can say whether the work has succeeded or is merely continuing.

Original text of the legal act

The text below is reproduced in Romanian, the official form of publication.

The full text, as published in the Official Gazette of Romania

Official Gazette of Romania no. 850 of 9 October 2026, pages 14-16 16 pages PDF, 167 KB the act starts on page 14

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