In brief

  • The EU sanctions over Russia’s destabilising activities run for another year, until 9 October 2027. Decision (CFSP) 2026/2258 changes a single date in Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643: in Article 10, first paragraph, „9 October 2026” is replaced by „9 October 2027”. Without this act the regime would have lapsed on the very day the extension entered into force.
  • The list loses one position and is rewritten in eight places. Entry 11, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva, is deleted from Table „A. Natural persons”. Entries 4, 6, 20, 23, 27, 28, 29 and 57 are replaced in full, each keeping its original date of listing. No legal person, no entity and none of the other annexes of the regime are touched.
  • Two of the eight are citizens of the Republic of Moldova, with an address in Chisinau. Iurie and Ivan Neculiti, the brothers behind the web hosting provider Stark Industries, receive rewritten reasons that track the infrastructure moved in 2025 to two other companies. Both acts apply in Romania from 9 October 2026, with no national implementing measure.
Act: Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2258 of 8 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2257 of 8 October 2026 implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities
Published: Official Journal of the European Union, L series, 2026/2258 and 2026/2257 of 8 October 2026
In force from: 9 October 2026, the day following that of publication, under Article 2 of each of the two acts

The European sanctions regime aimed at Russia’s covert operations in Europe, the one that covers sabotage, cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and the instrumentalisation of migrants, was due to expire on 9 October 2026. The Council has extended it by a year, in a decision adopted and published on the same day, 8 October. The mechanism is the same one the Council used in September, when it extended the Ukraine sanctions by a single week: the regime is not rewritten, one date in the closing article is replaced. Here the new date is 9 October 2027.

The extension comes bundled with a tidying-up of the list. The annex to the two acts removes one person and rewrites the entries of eight others, and those are the only operations on the list: no addition, no legal person touched, no change to the other annexes of the regime. In recital (2) the Council sets out the political context, the report approved by the European Parliament on 16 September 2026, which warned against increased hybrid threats against the Union, demanded a firmer Union response and pointed to Russia as „the gravest hybrid-threat state actor targeting the Union”. The ground for the extension itself is a different one and it is written in recital (3): a review of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, on the basis of which the Council considers that the restrictive measures set out in it should be renewed.

The regime works through two instruments that travel together. The common foreign and security policy act is Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, the one that obliges Member States to refuse entry into their territory to the persons on the list. Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 is the directly applicable act, the one that freezes funds and economic resources and prohibits making money available to those sanctioned, with no need for a Romanian transposing law. That is why the act of 8 October 2026 comes in two pieces: the decision extends the regime and amends the annex to the decision, while the implementing regulation makes exactly the same amendment to the annex to the regulation. The extension appears only in the decision, because the regulation has no expiry date: Article 20 of it provides only for entry into force.

Counting the consolidated version of Annex I shows how large the list being worked on is. Before 9 October 2026, Table „A. Natural persons” had 81 entries and Table „B. Legal persons, entities and bodies” 20, that is 101 positions. After entry 11 is deleted, 80 and 20 remain, that is one hundred. The nine entries touched by this act, one deleted and eight rewritten, amount to 11% of the table of natural persons. None of these figures appears in the act.

What it changes in practice

For those who stay on the list, nothing changes in substance. The measures are still the two from 2024, and the extension keeps them running for another twelve months.

  • The entry ban. Member States are to take the measures necessary to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of the natural persons on the list, under Article 1(1) of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643. A Member State is not obliged to refuse entry to its own nationals, paragraph (2) of the same article provides, and derogations may be granted on urgent humanitarian grounds, for intergovernmental meetings or for judicial proceedings, including surrender and extradition.
  • The asset freeze. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by the persons and entities on the list are frozen. In parallel, no one may make funds or economic resources available to them, directly or indirectly.
  • The anti-circumvention ban. Article 9(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 prohibits knowing and intentional participation in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measures, including where the person involved does not pursue circumvention but accepts that it may occur.
  • Contracts are no longer performed in favour of those sanctioned. No claim based on a contract the performance of which has been affected by the measures is to be satisfied, including claims for damages or for payment under a guarantee, and the burden of proving that a claim is not caught by the prohibition lies with the person making it.
  • The reporting obligation. A newly listed person or entity must report, within six weeks, the funds and economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State that it owns or controls. Separately, any natural or legal person is to supply the competent authority forthwith with any information that facilitates compliance with the regulation, such as accounts and amounts frozen.

For Romania, the part that matters is the scope. Article 19 of the regulation makes it binding within the territory of the Union, including its airspace, on board any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State, on any national of a Member State wherever located, on any company incorporated in a Member State and on any legal person in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union. Put plainly, a company in Cluj does not escape the prohibition because it pays a supplier outside the Union, and a Romanian national does not escape it because he operates from a third country.

The checking falls on ordinary operators, not on some authority that announces whom you must stop paying: the bank, the payment institution, the notary, the accountant, but also the firm that brokers IT services or resells hosting. The penalties do not come from the regulation. Article 15(1) leaves it to the Member States to lay down the rules on the penalties applicable to infringements, with the requirement that they be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. In Romania, the framework through which international sanctions are applied is Law no. 217/2009 on the legal regime for the implementation of international sanctions.

One detail with practical effect: rewriting the eight entries does not reopen the six-week reporting period, because the date of listing stays as it was, 16 December 2024 for two of them, 20 May 2025 for five and 15 December 2025 for one. What does reopen is the argument over the reasons: the Council communicates the decision and the grounds for listing to the person concerned, directly if it knows the address or through a notice in the Official Journal, and gives that person the opportunity to present observations. Where substantial new observations or evidence are submitted, the Council reviews the listing. The judicial route, before the General Court of the European Union, remains open under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

Until 8 October 2026, Article 10, first paragraph, of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 said that the decision applied until 9 October 2026. This was not the first extension: the text adopted in 2024 had set the deadline at 9 October 2025, and Decision (CFSP) 2025/2019 replaced that paragraph, with effect from 7 October 2025, and moved it to 9 October 2026. Now comes the second extension, again by a year.

The rhythm is visible and worth saying out loud: the Council adopts the extension a day or two before expiry, just as in 2025. On 8 October 2026 the act was adopted in Brussels and published the same day, and its entry into force, 9 October 2026, falls on the very last day of validity of the previous version. The margin is zero.

The second change is the deletion of entry 11. Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva had been listed on 16 December 2024 as a Russian businesswoman, the wife and business partner of another sanctioned person, through the co-ownership of two companies in Russia. She is the only exit from the list carried out by this act, and neither of the two acts says why: neither the recitals nor the annex gives a reason for the deletion.

The third change is the most substantial and at the same time the one the act leaves unsaid. The annex replaces eight entries with new „corresponding entries”, but nowhere shows what has changed in each of them. The reader sees the new text, not the difference. Compared with the consolidated form of the annex as it stood before 9 October 2026, the changes are the following:

  • Entry 4, Andrey Vladimirovich Averyanov. The description moves up a rung: from a high-ranking officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the military intelligence service known as the GRU, he becomes its deputy director. The function, the command of GRU unit 29155 and the rank of major general move into the identifying information.
  • Entry 6, Vladimir Vladimirovich Sergiyenko. A new activity is added, host of a Russian radio programme and a regular contributor to another channel, and the ground is widened: instead of the democracy, the rule of law and the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, the new text speaks of the Union and its Member States, and a second ground is added to the first, the use of information manipulation and interference.
  • Entry 20, Hüseyin Doğru. The only change is in the identifying information, and it goes to substance: the nationality drops from „Turkish, German” to „German”. For a listed person, nationality is the criterion on which a Member State decides whether or not it is obliged to refuse that person entry, not a biographical note.
  • Entry 23, Alina Lipp. A single sentence is added, and it changes the nature of the accusation: her dissemination activities „are supported by the Russian State”. Until now the text described them without expressly asserting state support.
  • Entries 27 and 28, Iurie Neculiti and Ivan Neculiti. The most extensive rewriting. The tense of the verbs moves to the past, he „was” the chief executive officer and the owner respectively of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., and the reasons describe what happened in 2025: the company’s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly established entity, WorkTitans B.V., which served as a front, while a second entity, MIRhosting, ensured the connection to the internet. The two brothers are named as the beneficiaries of the set-up, which is treated as an attempt to obfuscate ownership. The ground for listing shifts expressly onto their standing as former managers and as beneficiaries of the front companies, and the list of associations is extended to the two new companies.
  • Entry 29, Andrei Kharkovsky. The role drops, from representative of a Russian Cossack organisation to supporter of it, and the assertion that he is himself involved in acts of violence disappears. In exchange, there is added the association with two named persons and the provision of security services at events where fundraisers for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine took place, while the ground is extended to the undermining of the democratic political process in Germany.
  • Entry 57, Jacques Baud. The ground changes in two places: the undermining of democracy is added, and the express mention of the third country, Ukraine, disappears. What remains is the generic wording „in a third country”, without saying which one.

For Romania, entries 27 and 28 are the ones that count. Iurie and Ivan Neculiti hold the nationality of the Republic of Moldova, were born in Bender and have, in the identifying information, two addresses: one in London, at a maildrop registered office, and one in Chisinau. Web hosting is not a local business: a server rented out of Chisinau serves clients from anywhere, Romania included, and the company the two of them ran, Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., is itself on the list since 20 May 2025, with its websites recorded in its identifying information. For anyone who buys or resells hosting, that moves the checking out of the financial area and into ordinary IT service contracts.

Advantages and disadvantages

What it improves

  • The regime is not interrupted. The extension enters into force on the last day of validity of the previous version, so there is no single day on which the frozen funds would have become available again.
  • The extension is done by changing one date, not by rewriting the regime. Anyone who built an internal screening procedure in 2024 or 2025 has nothing to change in it.
  • The rewritten entries follow reality, not the paperwork. In the case of the Neculiti brothers, the Council describes the 2025 restructuring and names the companies through which the infrastructure passed, instead of keeping a statement of reasons that no longer matches.
  • The date of listing is left untouched in all eight entries, which keeps the age of the measure clear for each person and does not restart administrative deadlines that have already run.
  • One person actually leaves the list, which shows that periodic review does not work in one direction only. On a regime with one hundred positions, one entry going out is the only proof that the list is being reread and not merely renewed.

What remains a problem

  • The act does not say what has changed in the eight entries. Whoever applies the measures has to compare the new text with the old one himself, across eight texts of several hundred words each, in order to find out whether the difference concerns him.
  • The deletion of entry 11 carries no reasoning at all. The recitals say only that one entry „should be deleted”, with not a word about the basis, and an unreasoned exit from the list is just as hard to read as an unreasoned entry.
  • Two companies are named in the reasons as a front and as a connectivity provider for the Neculiti brothers’ infrastructure, yet neither is listed by this act. Capturing them is left to the indirect mechanism of assets owned or controlled, which every bank applies on its own account.
  • In entry 57 the name of the third country disappears from the ground for listing. A ground that no longer shows where the effect occurred is harder to challenge and harder to verify.
  • The annex to the decision and the annex to the regulation ought to be identical word for word, being the same list in two instruments. In the Romanian version of the two acts they are not: in three places one writes „guvernului Federației Ruse” and the other „Guvernului Federației Ruse”, in the Romanian original. The difference is one of capitalisation only and changes nothing in law, but it shows that the texts do not come from a single source; the English version of the annex to the decision writes „the Government of the Russian Federation” consistently.

Practical advice

  1. If you have a sanctions screening procedure, update it as at 9 October 2026, not 8 October. Both acts enter into force the day following publication, so the old version of the annex was valid throughout 8 October.
  2. Search for the persons by name, not by entry number. Numbers can migrate, and this act removes entry 11 without saying whether the numbering keeps a gap there or is renumbered.
  3. Check Table B, the one for legal persons, too, even though the act does not touch it. The company through which two of the persons with rewritten entries operated is listed separately, with its websites recorded in its identifying information, and a payment to a website is usually made without anyone opening the annex.
  4. If you pay for web hosting, cloud infrastructure or server resale services to suppliers outside the Union, run the list through your supplier filter, not only through your client filter. The two entries rewritten by this act concern exactly that kind of service.
  5. Do not stop at nationality and name when you check a match. The annex gives, where they exist, the date and place of birth, the passport, the tax number and the address, and a rewritten entry may change precisely those fields: in one of the eight, the only change was the nationality.
  6. If you discover funds or assets that fall under the freeze, notify the competent authority immediately and keep proof of the notification. The obligation to supply forthwith the information that facilitates compliance with the regulation does not depend on a prior request.
  7. If a contract of yours has become unperformable because of the measures, do not count on the damages clause. Claims based on such a contract are not satisfied in favour of those on the list, and the burden of proving that a claim is not caught by the prohibition falls on the person making it.
  8. If you are on the list and want to challenge it, use both routes. Observations addressed to the Council trigger a review where they bring substantial new evidence, and an action before the General Court of the European Union has its own time limit, which runs from the notification or publication of the act.

Frequently asked questions

Until when do the sanctions now apply?
Until 9 October 2027. The new date comes from Decision (CFSP) 2026/2258, which replaces, in Article 10, first paragraph, of Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643, the date „9 October 2026” with „9 October 2027”. The regime is kept under constant review, so it can also be amended before that deadline.
Why are there two acts for the same measure?
Because the regime sits in two instruments. The decision is the common foreign and security policy act, which provides for the entry ban and binds the Member States; the regulation is the directly applicable act, which freezes funds. The decision extends the regime and amends its own annex, while the implementing regulation makes the same amendment to the annex to the regulation. The extension appears only in the decision, because the regulation has no expiry date.
Does anything have to be adopted in Romania for the sanctions to apply?
No. Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 applies directly, without transposition, and the amendment of its annex takes effect in Romania from 9 October 2026. What is left to the State is the regime of penalties for infringement, which Article 15(1) leaves to the Member States, and the national framework for implementing international sanctions.
Who exactly is bound by the prohibition?
Anyone within the territory of the Union, including its airspace, anyone on board an aircraft or a vessel under the jurisdiction of a Member State, any national of a Member State wherever located, any company incorporated in a Member State and any legal person, in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union. Article 19 of the regulation lists them all.
How many persons and entities are on the list now?
The act gives no totals. Counting the consolidated version of Annex I shows 81 entries in the table of natural persons and 20 in the table of legal persons, entities and bodies before this act. After entry 11 is deleted, 80 and 20 remain, that is one hundred positions.
What has changed in the eight rewritten entries?
The act does not say, and the difference shows only by comparison with the previous version. In short: a function raised to deputy director of the Russian military intelligence service, a nationality cut from two to one, a new sentence about Russian State support, a ground widened from a single Member State to the Union as a whole, a role lowered from representative to supporter, a mention of a third country deleted from a ground and, for two of the eight, a description of the restructuring through which their infrastructure passed in 2025 to two other companies.
Who was removed from the list, and why?
Entry 11, Olga Alekseevna Belyavtseva, listed on 16 December 2024. Neither of the two acts shows the reason for the deletion: the recitals say only that the entry concerning one natural person should be deleted from the annex.
Does rewriting an entry amount to a new listing?
No. The date of listing stays unchanged in all eight, so the six-week period within which the person must report the funds within the jurisdiction of a Member State does not reopen. What changes are the reasons, and the reasons are precisely what can be challenged.
What does the act have to do with the Republic of Moldova?
Two of the eight rewritten entries concern brothers holding the nationality of the Republic of Moldova, born in Bender, with a declared address both in London, at a maildrop registered office, and in Chisinau. Their rewritten reasons describe a web hosting service provider and two companies through which its infrastructure passed in 2025.
What does a Romanian company risk if it pays a listed person?
The payment falls under the prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to a listed person, directly or indirectly, and intentional participation in a circumvention scheme is prohibited separately. The penalty comes from national law, where the sanctions must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, not from the regulation. On top of that, claims based on the affected contract are no longer satisfied.

Errors and inconsistencies in the published text

  • Entries 27 and 28 of Table „A. Natural persons”, the „Function” field against the statement of reasons of the same entry and against entry 9 of Table „B. Legal persons, entities and bodies”. In the form given by this act, entry 27 keeps in its identifying information the note „Function: CEO of Stark Industries” and entry 28 the note „Function: Owner of Stark Industries and PQ Hosting”, both in the present tense. The statement of reasons of those same two entries, rewritten by this very act, says the opposite: Iurie Neculiti „was the CEO of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.”, Ivan Neculiti „was the owner of Stark Industries Solutions Ltd.”, the company „provided” server hosting, and in 2025 its technical infrastructure was transferred to WorkTitans B.V., with MIRhosting ensuring the connection to the internet. The ground for listing is expressly reset on the standing of „former CEO” and „former owner” respectively, and of beneficiary of the front companies. The contradiction does not stop inside those entries: entry 9 of Table B, which this act does not touch, continues to state that Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. is owned and managed by the two of them through the PQ Hosting web hosting service and that the company provides server hosting, with server locations all over the world. A reader in good faith can reach two different legal conclusions about the same thing, and the thing is not theoretical: the freeze covers not only the funds of listed persons but also those owned or controlled by them, so the reach of the measure depends on who controls what today. On the first reading, that of the „Function” field and of entry 9, the chain of control still runs through the listed company and through the hosting service named in its identifying information, and the companies named as successors are no more than names in a historical account. On the second reading, that of the rewritten statement of reasons, the chain moved in 2025 to WorkTitans B.V., which is not listed but is described as a front for beneficiaries who are, so its funds fall under the freeze through the mechanism of assets owned or controlled. The bank, the payment processor or the firm that resells hosting has to decide one way or the other, and the two ways produce opposite answers to a very concrete question: is this payment prohibited or not. The correction called for has three steps, all of them minimal and all of them on the annex to both acts. First, the „Function” field of entries 27 and 28 is brought into the past tense of the statement of reasons, with the express word „former”, or is completed with the date from which the standing ended. Second, entry 9 of Table B is replaced in the same operation, so that the description of the company reflects the 2025 transfer that the act itself records in entries 27 and 28. Third, if the Council intends WorkTitans B.V. and MIRhosting to be caught by the measure, they are to be listed with entries of their own, instead of being left named in someone else’s reasons.

Editorial analysis

The extension itself is cleanly done. One date changes, the article concerned is identified down to the paragraph, and entry into force covers without a gap the day on which the previous version had ceased to apply. On an act that keeps an asset freeze running, continuity is the basic test and it is passed. Equally clean is the fact that the extension appears only in the decision: the regulation has no expiry date, so an extension written there as well would have been a provision without an object.

The part that does not work is the communication of the list changes, and it is not a drafting defect, it is a defect of method. The annex replaces eight entries with new „corresponding entries”, without saying anywhere what has changed in them. The reader receives eight long texts, each of several hundred words, with no indication of what is new. The real differences, which we established by comparison with the previous version of the annex, are very uneven: one of the eight entries changed only in the nationality, from „Turkish, German” to „German”, while another gained a single new sentence. Two were rewritten almost entirely. Whoever applies the measures, that is a bank or a compliance department, has no way of finding out which of the eight concerns him without making the comparison himself, and the comparison requires the consolidated version of the annex as it stood before the act, which is not an official document. A correlation table, or simply one sentence per entry in the recitals, would settle this in a few lines.

The second observation concerns what does not go on the list. Entries 27 and 28 describe, in unusual detail for a sanctions annex, how the technical infrastructure of an already listed company was moved in 2025: a newly established entity serving as a front, a second one ensuring its connection to the internet, the two brothers named as beneficiaries of the set-up. The Council names both companies, characterises their role and finds that the arrangement seeks to obfuscate ownership. Then it lists neither of them. On the letter of the regime this is not an oversight, because the freeze also catches assets owned or controlled by listed persons, but in practice the difference is large: a listed entity is identified by address, registration number and website, whereas an entity named only in someone else’s reasons has to be recognised by each operator on his own. For a regime that expressly targets digital infrastructure, leaving the front outside the list is the most expensive choice in the whole act.

The third observation is about renumbering. This is, as far as the list shows, the first act to delete an entry from the table of natural persons, and the text does not say what happens to the numbering after a deletion: does a gap remain at position 11, or is everything that follows renumbered. The question is not cosmetic, because every amending act so far, this one included, identifies entries by number, not by name. If the list is silently renumbered, any future act that says „entries 20, 23, 27” will point to persons other than those intended. In this act the risk does not materialise, because the replaced entries come with the full name of the person, so the target is unambiguous. For the next one, though, a single sentence in the annex, along the lines of „the numbering remains unchanged”, would close the matter for good.

Finally, the rhythm. The extension was adopted and published on 8 October, entering into force on 9 October, the last day of validity of the previous version, exactly as in 2025. Legally, continuity is secured. Operationally, a margin of zero days leaves those who apply the measures in an awkward position: until the day before, there is no published certainty that the regime continues, even though contracts, accounts and reporting are prepared weeks ahead. The constant review provided for in Article 10 would also allow a decision taken a month in advance, at no legal cost.

What should be changed

  • One sentence per replaced entry, in the recitals or in a note to the annex, saying what has changed. Eight entries rewritten without the difference being indicated oblige every operator to redo the comparison himself, on a consolidated text that has no official status. In one of the eight entries, the change was a single word in the identifying information.
  • Reasons for deleting an entry, however brief. Leaving the list is an act with effects, just as joining it is. A recital saying only that the entry „should be deleted” leaves no one, neither the person concerned nor those who apply the measure, able to understand whether the basis has gone or the Council’s assessment has changed.
  • Listing the companies named as fronts, with entries of their own. If the act finds that the infrastructure passed in 2025 to WorkTitans B.V., with MIRhosting providing connectivity, then their identifying information belongs in the annex, not in the statement of reasons of other entries.
  • An express note on numbering after an entry is deleted. The list is amended by numbers, so the rule has to be written once, at the first deletion, and not inferred by every reader.
  • The name of the third country kept in the ground for listing. In entry 57, deleting the mention of Ukraine from the ground adds nothing and reduces the verifiability of the accusation, in a regime where the ground is the only thing the person concerned can challenge.
  • A single source for the annexes to the two acts. The differences in capitalisation between the annex to the decision and the annex to the regulation have no legal consequence, but they show that the two lists, which have to be identical, are produced separately. On a text of this length, tomorrow the difference may fall on a name or a figure.
  • The extension decided a month before expiry, not a day. The constant review provided for in Article 10 already allows this, and the margin would spare operators from preparing two scenarios at once, continuation and lapse, in the last week of the period.

Original text of the legal act

The text below is reproduced in Romanian, the official form of publication.

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Decizia (PESC) 2026/2258 a Consiliului din 8 octombrie 2026 de modificare a Deciziei (PESC) 2024/2643 privind măsuri restrictive având în vedere activitățile destabilizatoare ale Rusiei

EMITENT: Consiliul Uniunii Europene

Publicat în: Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, seria L, 2026/2258 din 8 octombrie 2026

DECIZIA (PESC) 2026/2258 A CONSILIULUI

din 8 octombrie 2026

de modificare a Deciziei (PESC) 2024/2643 privind măsuri restrictive având în vedere activitățile destabilizatoare ale Rusiei

CONSILIUL UNIUNII EUROPENE,

având în vedere Tratatul privind Uniunea Europeană, în special articolul 29,

având în vedere propunerea Înaltului Reprezentant al Uniunii pentru afaceri externe și politica de securitate,

întrucât:

(1) La 8 octombrie 2024, Consiliul a adoptat Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 (1).

(2) La 16 septembrie 2026, Parlamentul European a aprobat un raport în care a avertizat împotriva amenințărilor hibride în creștere împotriva Uniunii și a solicitat un răspuns mai ferm al Uniunii. Raportul identifică Rusia ca fiind cel mai periculos actor statal care reprezintă o amenințare hibridă la adresa Uniunii.

(3) Pe baza unei reexaminări a Deciziei (PESC) 2024/2643, Consiliul a decis că măsurile restrictive prevăzute în respectiva decizie ar trebui să fie reînnoite până la 9 octombrie 2027.

(4) Consiliul consideră că rubricile referitoare la opt persoane fizice din lista persoanelor fizice și juridice, a entităților și a organismelor prevăzută în anexa I la Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 ar trebui să fie modificată, iar rubrica referitoare la o persoană fizică ar trebui să fie eliminată din anexa respectivă.

(5) Prin urmare, Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 ar trebui să fie modificată în consecință,

ADOPTĂ PREZENTA DECIZIE:

Articolul 1

Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 se modifică după cum urmează:

1. La articolul 10 primul paragraf, data „9 octombrie 2026” se înlocuiește cu data „9 octombrie 2027”.

2. Anexa I se modifică în conformitate cu anexa la prezenta decizie.

Articolul 2

Prezenta decizie intră în vigoare în ziua următoare datei publicării în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene.

Adoptată la Bruxelles, 8 octombrie 2026.

Pentru Consiliu

Președintele

T. BYRNE

(1) Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 a Consiliului din 8 octombrie 2024 privind măsuri restrictive având în vedere activitățile destabilizatoare ale Rusiei (JO L, 2024/2643, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2643/oj).

ANEXĂ

Anexa I la Decizia (PESC) 2024/2643 se modifică după cum urmează:

„11. Olga Alekseevna BELYAVTSEVA”.

Nume Date de identificare Expunere de motive Data includerii pe listă
„4. Andrey Vladimirovich AVERYANOV (rusă: Андрей Владимирович АВЕРЬЯНОВ) Funcția: director adjunct al Direcției principale a Statului-Major al Forțelor Armate ale Federației Ruse (GRU), comandant al unității 29155 a GRU, General-maior Data nașterii: 29.9.1967 Locul nașterii: URSS (în prezent Federația Rusă) Cetățenia: rusă Sexul: masculin Codul de identificare fiscală (INN): 773378888007 Andrey Averyanov este director adjunct al Direcției principale a Statului-Major al Forțelor Armate ale Federației Ruse (GRU). După moartea lui Evgheni Prigojin și restructurarea Grupului Wagner, comanda operațiilor militare ruse în Africa a fost restructurată și subordonată Corpului african sub egida Ministerului Apărării din Rusia, iar lui Averyanov i-a fost încredințată conducerea acestora. În multe țări africane, forțele ruse furnizează securitate juntelor militare, care au răsturnat guvernele democratice legitime, afectând grav stabilitatea, securitatea și democrația acestor țări. În plus, forțele ruse din Africa exploatează resursele naturale locale pentru a-și finanța operațiunile. La începutul anului 2024, forțele ruse au preluat controlul asupra minei de aur Intahaka din Mali. Prin urmare, Andrey Averyanov pune în aplicare acțiuni sau politici ale guvernului Federației Ruse care subminează sau amenință democrația, statul de drept, stabilitatea sau securitatea în țări terțe prin subminarea procesului politic democratic în țările africane în care operează forțele ruse și prin exploatarea unui conflict armat, a instabilității sau a insecurității, inclusiv prin exploatarea ilicită a resurselor naturale și a speciilor sălbatice de faună și floră sau comerțul ilicit cu acestea într-o țară terță. 16.12.2024
6. Vladimir Vladimirovich SERGIYENKO (rusă: Владимир Владимирович СЕРГИЕНКО) Funcția: Fost asistent al deputatului în Bundestag Eugen Schmidt Data nașterii: 23.5.1971 Locul nașterii: Lviv, RSS Ucraineană (în prezent Ucraina) Cetățenia: rusă/ucraineană Sexul: masculin Vladimir Sergiyenko a fost asistent parlamentar al deputatului Eugen Schmidt în Bundestagul german. În paralel, Sergiyenko a colaborat activ cu ofițerii de informații ruși care au încercat să folosească accesul parlamentar și politic privilegiat al acestuia pentru a prejudicia procesul politic democratic și ordinea constituțională a Republicii Federale Germania. De asemenea, este gazda programului de radio rus «Eurozone» pe Vesti FM și găzduiește periodic reportaje radio pe Balt News. El utilizează platformele respective pentru a răspândi dezinformare cu privire la Uniunea Europeană și la statele sale membre. Prin urmare, Vladimir Sergiyenko a pus în aplicare și a sprijinit acțiuni sau politici ale guvernului Federației Ruse care subminează sau amenință democrația, statul de drept și securitatea în Uniune și în statele sale membre, prin implicarea, în mod direct sau indirect, în obstrucționarea sau subminarea procesului politic democratic și prin implicarea, în mod direct sau indirect, în utilizarea manipulării informațiilor și a ingerințelor informaționale și sprijinirea acestora. 16.12.2024
20. Hüseyin DOGRU Cetățenie: germană Sexul: masculin Hüseyin Doğru este fondatorul și reprezentantul AFA Medya A.Ș., o societate din domeniul mass-mediei cu sediul la Istanbul. AFA Medya A.Ș. exploatează «RED», care cuprinde o serie de platforme mass-media și care are conexiuni financiare și organizaționale strânse cu entități și actori implicați în propaganda de stat rusă; de asemenea, are legături structurale profunde cu organizații mass-media de stat ruse, care implică, printre altele, interconexiuni între membrii personalului și rotații de membri ai personalului. RED a utilizat platformele sale mass-media – publicând adesea sub eticheta «redstreamnet» sau «thered.stream» – pentru a răspândi în mod sistematic informații false cu privire la subiecte controversate politic cu scopul de a crea discordie la nivel etnic, politic și religios în rândul publicului său țintă predominant german, inclusiv prin diseminarea de discursuri ale unor grupări teroriste islamice radicale, cum ar fi Hamas. În timpul ocupării prin violență a unei universități germane de către protestatari antiisraelieni, personalul RED s-a coordonat cu aceștia pentru a disemina, pe canalele online ale RED, imagini ale actelor de vandalism comise, care includeau utilizarea unor simboluri ale Hamas, oferind astfel protestatarilor o platformă mass-media exclusivă și facilitând caracterul violent al protestului. Hüseyin Doğru continuă să răspândească informații false prin intermediul AFA Medya A.Ș., precum și prin intermediul propriilor sale conturi de pe platformele de comunicare socială. Așadar, prin intermediul AFA Medya A.Ș. și al conturilor sale personale de pe platformele de comunicare socială, Hüseyin Doğru sprijină acțiuni ale Guvernului Federației Ruse care subminează sau amenință stabilitatea și securitatea în Uniune și în unul sau mai multe state membre, inclusiv prin facilitarea și sprijinirea indirectă a unor demonstrații violente și prin implicarea în acțiuni coordonate de manipulare a informațiilor. 20.5.2025
23. Alina LIPP Funcția: corespondent de război Data nașterii: 17.9.1993 Locul nașterii: Hamburg Cetățenia: germană Sexul: feminin Alina Lipp administrează blogul «Neues aus Russland», unde diseminează în mod sistematic informații eronate cu privire la războiul de agresiune al Rusiei împotriva Ucrainei și delegitimează guvernul ucrainean, în special în vederea manipulării opiniei publice germane cu privire la sprijinul pentru Ucraina. Respectivele activități sunt sprijinite de statul rus. În plus, se folosește de rolul ei de corespondent de război pe lângă forțele armate ruse din estul Ucrainei pentru a răspândi propaganda de război a Rusiei. Ea apare periodic în emisiuni de propagandă și divertisment adresate soldaților, difuzate pe canalul TV militar rus Zvezda. Așadar, Alina Lipp se implică în acțiuni ale Guvernului Federației Ruse care subminează sau amenință securitatea și stabilitatea în Uniune și într-o țară terță (Ucraina) și sprijină astfel de acțiuni, prin utilizarea ingerințelor și a manipulării coordonate a informațiilor și prin facilitarea unui conflict armat într-o țară terță. 20.5.2025
27. Iurie NECULITI (rusă: Юрие НЕКУЛИТИ) Funcția: director executiv al Stark Industries Cetățenia: Republica Moldova Sexul: masculin Adresă: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom (Londra, Regatul Unit); Chișinău, Republica Moldova Locul nașterii: Bender, Republica Moldova Iurie Neculiti a fost directorul executiv al Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., un furnizor de servicii de găzduire web înregistrat în Regatul Unit sub forma unei societăți cu sediu virtual (mail drop). Societatea a furnizat servicii de găzduire pe servere situate în întreaga lume. În 2025, infrastructura tehnică a Stark Industries Solutions Ltd a fost transferată către o entitate nou înființată, WorkTitans B.V., care a servit drept paravan, în timp ce o a doua entitate, MIRhosting, s-a asigurat că prima era conectată la internet. Iurie Neculiti și Ivan Neculiti sunt menționați ca beneficiari ai acestui montaj, despre care se consideră că constituie o încercare de a ascunde identitatea proprietarilor și de a menține oferirea de servicii de găzduire în cadrul unor noi entități juridice și de rețea. Rețeaua respectivă de entități permite unor diverși actori sponsorizați de statul rus și afiliați acestuia să desfășoare activități destabilizatoare, inclusiv manipularea coordonată a informațiilor, ingerințe și atacuri cibernetice împotriva Uniunii și a țărilor terțe prin furnizarea de servicii menite să ascundă aceste activități față de autoritățile europene de aplicare a legii și de securitate. Prin urmare, în calitate de fost director executiv al Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. și de beneficiar al societăților paravan ale acesteia, Iurie Neculiti sprijină acțiuni ale Guvernului Federației Ruse care amenință democrația și statul de drept, stabilitatea sau securitatea în Uniune, într-un stat membru și într-o țară terță, prin facilitarea utilizării manipulării informațiilor și prin ingerințe și prin facilitarea unor acțiuni care afectează funcționarea instituțiilor democratice, a activităților economice sau a serviciilor de interes public. Iurie Neculiti este asociat cu Ivan Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. și MIRHosting. 20.5.2025
28. Ivan NECULITI (rusă: Иван НЕКУЛИТИ) Funcția: proprietar al Stark Industries și PQ Hosting Cetățenia: Republica Moldova Sexul: masculin Adresă: 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, United Kingdom (Londra, Regatul Unit); Chișinău, Republica Moldova Locul nașterii: Bender, Republica Moldova Ivan Neculiti a fost proprietarul Stark Industries Solutions Ltd., un furnizor de servicii de găzduire web înregistrat în Regatul Unit sub forma unei societăți cu sediu virtual (mail drop). Societatea a furnizat servicii de găzduire pe servere situate în întreaga lume. În 2025, infrastructura tehnică a Stark Industries Solutions Ltd a fost transferată către o entitate nou înființată, WorkTitans B.V., care a servit drept paravan, în timp ce o a doua entitate, MIRhosting, s-a asigurat că prima era conectată la internet. Iurie Neculiti și Ivan Neculiti sunt menționați ca beneficiari ai acestui montaj, despre care se consideră că constituie o încercare de a ascunde identitatea proprietarilor și de a continua oferirea de servicii de găzduire în cadrul unor noi entități juridice și de rețea. Rețeaua respectivă de entități permite unor diverși actori sponsorizați de statul rus și afiliați acestuia să desfășoare activități destabilizatoare, inclusiv manipularea coordonată a informațiilor, ingerințe și atacuri cibernetice împotriva Uniunii și a țărilor terțe prin furnizarea de servicii menite să ascundă aceste activități față de autoritățile europene de aplicare a legii și de securitate. Ivan Neculiti este asociat cu Iurie Neculiti, Stark Industries, WorkTitans B.V. și MIRHosting. Prin urmare, în calitate de fost proprietar al Stark Industries Solutions Ltd. și beneficiar al societăților paravan ale acesteia, Ivan Neculiti sprijină acțiuni ale Guvernului Federației Ruse care amenință democrația și statul de drept, stabilitatea sau securitatea în Uniune, într-un stat membru și într-o țară terță, prin facilitarea utilizării manipulării informațiilor și prin ingerințe și prin facilitarea unor acțiuni care afectează funcționarea instituțiilor democratice, a activităților economice sau a serviciilor de interes public. 20.5.2025
29. Andrei KHARKOVSKY (rusă: Андрей ХАРКОВСКИЙ) Funcția: membru în conducerea Uniunii Războinicilor Cazaci din Rusia și din Străinătate Cetățenia: rusă Locul nașterii: regiunea Tomsk, Rusia Sexul: masculin Adresa: Germania Andrei Kharkovsky este un resortisant rus care trăiește în Germania. Kharkovsky este un susținător al Uniunii Războinicilor Cazaci din Rusia și din Străinătate și al organizațiilor similare de cazaci ruși, inclusiv prin organizarea de întruniri militare pentru membrii săi în Germania. Uniunea Războinicilor Cazaci din Rusia și din Străinătate este o entitate care are legături cu guvernul Federației Ruse și care participă la războiul de agresiune și la actele de violență ale Rusiei în Ucraina în sprijinul separatiștilor proruși, pornind de la premisa unei «misiuni istorice» de a restabili controlul Rusiei asupra sudului și estului Ucrainei. În plus, Kharkovsky este asociat cu Elena Kolbasnikova și Rostislav Teslyuk, inclusiv prin asigurarea serviciilor de securitate în timpul unor evenimente în cadrul cărora s-au organizat strângeri de fonduri pentru separatiștii pro-ruși din Ucraina. Prin urmare, Andrei Kharkovsky sprijină acțiuni ale guvernului rus care subminează suveranitatea și securitatea Ucrainei prin sprijinirea subminării ordinii și siguranței publice, inclusiv prin încercarea de a răsturna ordinea constituțională a Ucrainei. De asemenea, el sprijină persoane fizice care sprijină acțiuni ale guvernului Federației Ruse care subminează securitatea unei țări terțe (Ucraina) și care subminează democrația, statul de drept, stabilitatea sau securitatea într-un stat membru prin activități vizând subminarea procesului politic democratic în Germania. 20.5.2025
57. Jacques BAUD Funcție: fost colonel în armata elvețiană; fost analist strategic, specialist în informații și terorism. Data nașterii: 1.4.1955 Cetățenia: elvețiană Sexul: masculin Jacques Baud, fost colonel în armata elvețiană și analist strategic, este invitat în mod regulat să participe la programe de televiziune și radio proruse. El diseminează propaganda prorusă și produce teorii ale conspirației, acuzând, de exemplu, Ucraina că și-a orchestrat propria invazie pentru a deveni membră a NATO. Prin urmare, Jacques Baud, este răspunzător pentru acțiuni sau politici care pot fi atribuite Guvernului Federației Ruse și care subminează democrația și amenință stabilitatea sau securitatea într-o țară terță, pune în aplicare astfel de acțiuni sau politici ori le sprijină, prin implicarea în utilizarea manipulării informațiilor și a ingerințelor informaționale. 15.12.2025”
Sursă: Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, seria L, 2026/2258 din 8 octombrie 2026

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