Moral damages for honour or reputation: the stamp duty stays 100 lei, however much you claim

Anyone claiming compensation for harm to honour, dignity or reputation pays a fixed court stamp duty of 100 lei, however much they claim. The Constitutional Court dismissed as unfounded the plea raised by Asociația Civică Stop Discriminării Cetățenilor din București (the Stop the Discrimination of Bucharest Citizens Civic Association) and by Dan Băzăvan in a case pending before the Bucharest Tribunal, Second Division for Administrative and Tax Disputes, and found that Article 7(1) of Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 is constitutional. This is the second time in the past year that the stamp duty regime has passed the constitutional test, after court stamp duties in administrative litigation escaped constitutional review. Decision No 34 of 20 January 2026 was published in Official Gazette of Romania No 608 of 27 July 2026.

The underlying dispute is an application for review of the stamp duty, aimed at the way that duty had been set. The contested text consists of a single sentence: “Actions seeking the establishment and award of compensation for moral damages caused to the honour, dignity or reputation of a natural person are charged with a duty of 100 lei.”

The authors of the plea argued that the text restricts free access to justice, that it is ambiguous and that, carrying different meanings, it leads to duties being set inconsistently from one court to another. They invoked a long list of articles of the Constitution, from the Romanian state and equality before the law through to the right to strike, the right to private property and the standard of living, plus provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the European Convention on Human Rights.

What it changes in practice

The first effect is procedural. The decision is final and generally binding from publication, so the Bucharest Tribunal is bound by the Court’s conclusion, and the same plea can no longer be raised in the same case.

The second effect confirms the amount. The Court expressly holds that the duty established by Article 7 of Government Emergency Ordinance No 80/2013 has a fixed amount of 100 lei and that this is a reasonable amount, one that does not lead to a breach of free access to justice. Someone claiming 5,000 lei in moral damages and someone claiming 500,000 lei pay the same sum when the case is opened.

The third effect concerns the logic of the legislature. The Court points out that the legislative solution is justified as long as, in the case of moral damages caused to honour, dignity or reputation, the legislature opts for a system of fixed duties rather than for duties calculated on the value claimed. This is a choice of legislative policy that the Court cannot replace with another.

The fourth effect is the most important one to keep in mind before starting proceedings. The equivalent of the court stamp duty is included in the costs of the proceedings set by the court in its judgment, and payment of those costs falls on the losing party. In other words, the duty is an advance, not a permanent loss, if the case is won.

The fifth effect concerns the criticism of a lack of clarity. The Court held that paying taxes and duties is a constitutional obligation of citizens under Article 56(1) of the Constitution, and that meeting this obligation gives expression to the principle of legality in Article 1(5). The argument that the text lacks clarity can no longer be used.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

In law, nothing changes. The text remains in force in the same form, and the Court does no more than confirm its own case law, referring expressly to Decision No 403 of 18 September 2025, Decision No 418 of 28 May 2015 and Decision No 624 of 17 October 2017. The reasoning expressly closes the discussion: since no new elements have arisen, the grounds and the solution of the earlier decisions remain valid.

What does change is the position in the proceedings of those who were contesting the duty. The constitutional argument is spent, and from now on the discussion can only be about the concrete method of calculation, before the court hearing the application for review of the stamp duty.

The method by which the Court filtered the criticisms is also worth noting. Of the articles of the Constitution invoked, the Court held that a minimum claim of unconstitutionality could reasonably be identified only in relation to Article 1(5), the principle of legality, and Article 21, free access to justice. The remaining provisions, from the right to strike to the standard of living, bore no relationship of conflict with the challenged rule.

The filter rests on a rule of principle set out in Decision No 1313 of 4 October 2011: any plea of unconstitutionality must contain three elements, the contested text, the reference text allegedly breached and the reasoning on the relationship of conflict between them. The reasoning need not be extensive, but it must exist. Where the reference text invoked is precise enough, the Court is required to examine the plea on the merits, even if the author’s reasoning is brief.

On free access to justice, the Court also revisits the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In Ashingdane v the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 May 1985, it was established that access to justice is not an absolute right and may be limited, as long as its very substance is not impaired. In Kreuz v Poland, judgment of 19 June 2001, the European Court noted that it had never rejected the idea of financial restrictions on access to justice, precisely in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

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