In brief

  • The Constitutional Court has upheld the provision that punishes ultraj, the offence of assaulting or threatening a public official: the basic offence covers a threat made in person or by means of direct communication, not every form of threat.
  • The criticism came from police officers: the law was said to protect them less than it protects magistrates. The Court answers that the sentencing regime is identical, because the aggravated form of the offence increases the limits by one half where the victim is a police officer or a gendarme.
  • The decision matters to anyone who comes into contact with a public official exercising State authority: police officers, gendarmes, inspectors, town hall staff, and also people under investigation for such acts.
Act: CCR Decision no. 449/2025
Published: Official Gazette of Romania (Monitorul Oficial) no. 598 of 22 July 2026
Delivered: 16 October 2025

A police officer argued that the criminal law protects him less than it protects a judge or a prosecutor, and the Constitutional Court answered him with a comparison of figures. Decision no. 449 of 16 October 2025, now published in the Official Gazette of Romania, dismisses as unfounded the plea of unconstitutionality raised against Article 257(1), first sentence, of the Criminal Code, the provision that defines ultraj. This is the second time in recent months that the criminal protection of persons who exercise State authority has reached public debate, after Parliament adopted tougher penalties for assaulting medical staff.

The contested provision reads as follows: „A threat made in person or by means of direct communication, striking or other acts of violence, bodily harm, blows or injuries causing death, or murder committed against a public official holding a position that involves the exercise of State authority, while carrying out his duties or in connection with the carrying out of those duties, shall be punished with the penalty laid down by law for that offence, the special limits of which are increased by one third.”

The detail that set the case in motion is the wording „in person or by means of direct communication”. The author of the plea pointed out that, for the general offence of threat under Article 206 of the Criminal Code, the legislature draws no distinction between forms of communication, whereas for ultraj it kept this condition. The case started before the Câmpulung Moldovenesc District Court, in proceedings concerning a complaint against a decision not to prosecute, and more than five years passed between the referral made by that court, in April 2021, and the publication of the decision.

What it changes in practice

The first effect is the confirmation of the provision. Article 257(1), first sentence, remains in force exactly in the form criticised, and the sentencing limits of the underlying offence continue to be increased by one third.

The second effect concerns the structure of the offence, which the Court sets out point by point and which is not obvious on a first reading. Ultraj has a basic form, in paragraph (1), two assimilated forms, in paragraphs (2) and (3), and an aggravated form, in paragraph (4). The assimilated forms cover acts committed for the purpose of intimidation or revenge, in connection with the official’s duties, including acts against the public official’s property, as well as acts directed against a member of his family.

The third effect is the answer to the complaint of discrimination itself. Where the victim is a police officer or a gendarme, Article 257(4) applies and the special limits of the penalty are increased by one half, not by one third. The Court holds that the sentencing regime for the acts penalised under Article 257(4) and under Article 279(1) to (3), that is, the offence against a judicial official committed against a judge or a prosecutor, is one and the same. In other words, the police officer receives no less than the magistrate, but exactly as much.

The fourth effect is a rule of method that holds well beyond this case. The unconstitutionality of a rule is intrinsic to it and cannot be inferred by comparing two legislative provisions. The Court therefore refused to set Article 257(1) against Article 206, because otherwise one would reach the conclusion that each provision taken on its own is constitutional and that only their coexistence casts doubt on the constitutionality of one of them.

The fifth effect concerns the legal object of the offence, which is useful for understanding its limits. Ultraj protects, first and foremost, the social relations concerning the respect owed to the State authorities, and only secondarily a person’s psychological freedom, bodily integrity or life. For that reason, the protection attaches not to the person but to the office that person holds and to the moment when it is exercised.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

In the text of the law, nothing. The decision does not amend Article 257 and does not add any new situation. It is a ruling of dismissal, so it confirms the existing state of the law.

What has changed is the clarity of a practical question that comes up often in court files. Until now, the argument that a police officer is less protected than a judge circulated without any answer published directly on this provision. There is one now, and it is not a matter of principle but of arithmetic: the increase by one half under Article 257(4) matches the regime under Article 279.

The second clarification concerns the limits of the basic offence. The Court reproduces the provision with its explicit condition, a threat made in person or by means of direct communication, and does not extend that situation. Anyone examining a specific act must first check how the threat reached its addressee, because that is the element which separates ultraj from the general offence of threat.

The third clarification concerns the case law on which the ruling rests. The Court relies on Decision no. 446 of 28 June 2018 and on Decision no. 820 of 12 December 2019, both concerning the same article. This is therefore a settled line, not an isolated ruling.

Advantages and disadvantages

What it improves

  • The provision remains predictable: those who apply the law know that the basic offence requires a direct threat and that the aggravated form comes into play where the victim is a police officer or a gendarme.
  • The debate about the alleged discrimination between police officers and magistrates in matters of ultraj is closed, with published reasoning.
  • The Court restates that criminal protection follows the office and not the person, which keeps the offence within its natural limits and prevents arbitrary extensions.
  • The rule that unconstitutionality cannot be inferred from a comparison of two provisions protects the coherence of the Criminal Code, in which differences of regime are often deliberate.

What remains a problem

  • The underlying question, whether a threat passed on through an intermediary should fall under ultraj, is left to Parliament, and the Court cannot settle it.
  • The difference in wording between Article 206 and Article 257(1) continues to produce situations in which the same threat is classified differently, depending on the route by which it reached its addressee.
  • More than five years passed between the referral made by the court, in April 2021, and the publication of the decision, in July 2026, and throughout that time the original case remained on hold.
  • The Presidents of the two Chambers, the Government and the Ombudsman sent no observations, even though what was at stake was the criminal protection of an entire professional category.

Practical advice

  1. If you are a public official and you have been threatened while carrying out your duties, state in your complaint how the threat reached you. The fact that it was made face to face or over the telephone, that is, by a means of direct communication, is essential for the act to be classified as ultraj.
  2. Check whether you fall within the aggravated form. For police officers and gendarmes, Article 257(4) increases the limits of the penalty by one half, not by one third.
  3. Bear in mind that the offence also covers acts directed against the public official’s property or against a member of his family, where they are committed for the purpose of intimidation or revenge, in connection with his duties.
  4. If you are being investigated for ultraj, check whether the person concerned was in fact carrying out his duties or whether the act is connected with them. Without that condition, the ordinary offence applies, with lower limits.
  5. Do not build a plea of unconstitutionality on a comparison between two articles of the Code. The Court has repeatedly held that unconstitutionality is intrinsic to the provision challenged and is not inferred from the coexistence of different rules.
  6. If you want the rule changed, the route is a legislative proposal, not constitutional litigation. Defining offences and penalties falls within the competence of Parliament, under Article 73(3)(h) of the Constitution.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Constitutional Court decide?
It dismissed the plea as unfounded and found that Article 257(1), first sentence, of the Criminal Code is constitutional in relation to the criticisms put forward. The provision remains unchanged.
What does a threat made in person or by means of direct communication mean?
A threat addressed directly to the person, in his presence, or conveyed by a means that links the sender directly to the addressee, such as a telephone conversation. It is the condition that the law requires for the basic form of ultraj.
Are police officers protected less than judges and prosecutors?
No. The Court shows that the sentencing regime under Article 257(4), which applies where the victim is a police officer or a gendarme, is the same as the one under Article 279(1) to (3), which concerns the offence against a judicial official.
By how much are penalties increased for ultraj?
For the basic form and the assimilated forms, the special limits of the penalty laid down for the offence committed are increased by one third. For the aggravated form, where the victim is a police officer or a gendarme, they are increased by one half.
Does ultraj apply only to police officers?
No. The forms under Article 257(1) to (3) concern any public official holding a position that involves the exercise of State authority, while carrying out his duties or in connection with them. Being a police officer or a gendarme triggers only the aggravated form.
Why did the Court not compare ultraj with the offence of threat?
Because the unconstitutionality of a rule is intrinsic to it and cannot be inferred by reading several provisions together or setting them against one another. Otherwise one would reach the conclusion that each provision is constitutional but their coexistence is not.
Are acts against the public official’s family also covered?
Yes, through the assimilated forms under Article 257(2) and (3), where they are committed for the purpose of intimidation or revenge, in connection with the carrying out of his duties.
Can this provision be challenged again?
Yes, but on different grounds. The ruling concerns strictly the arguments examined in this case, and the Court has already upheld the provision in Decision no. 446/2018 and in Decision no. 820/2019.

Original text of the legal act

The text below is reproduced in Romanian, the official form of publication.

The full text, as published in the Official Gazette of Romania

Official Gazette of Romania no. 598 of 22 July 2026 16 pages PDF, 107 KB the act starts on page 2

Open the official PDFDownload the PDF

The viewer is not shown on small screens. Use the buttons above to open or download the file.

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific situations, consult a licensed attorney or tax advisor.