In brief
- A judge or a prosecutor can no longer be brought before the disciplinary bench once 2 years have passed since the act complained of, and the Constitutional Court has confirmed that the rule is constitutional. Decision no. 209 of 5 March 2026 was published on 21 September 2026 and is generally binding from that date.
- The period runs from the date on which the act was committed, not from the date on which it was discovered, nor from the date of the complaint. The text contains two limits in the same sentence: the disciplinary action may be brought within 30 days of the completion of the disciplinary investigation, but no later than 2 years after the act. The second cuts across the first: once the 2 years are up, the 30 days are of no use at all.
- The one who loses out is the person who made the complaint, not the state. The plea was raised by a complainant who had challenged before the administrative court the decisions of the Judicial Inspection closing her files. Although the law examined, Law no. 317/2004, has since been repealed, the same rule is today found in Article 47(7) of Law no. 305/2022, with the same 2-year period.
Published: Official Gazette of Romania (Monitorul Oficial) no. 798 of 21 September 2026
In force from: the decision is generally binding from the date of publication, 21 September 2026
Anyone who complains about a judge or a prosecutor to the Judicial Inspection and is told that the act is time-barred now also has confirmation from the constitutional court that the period which closed the file is in order. The Constitutional Court unanimously rejected the plea raised against the words „but no later than 2 years” in Article 46(7) of Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Council of Magistracy. It is one more of the decisions by which the Court leaves untouched the rules governing the career and the liability of magistrates, after the one published on 18 September 2026, which held that returning to the judiciary without an examination required 10 years of service.
The text at issue consists of a single sentence, reproduced by the Court itself: „The disciplinary action may be brought within 30 days of the completion of the disciplinary investigation, but no later than 2 years from the date on which the act was committed.” These are two periods that work together, but not in the same way. The first requires the judicial inspector not to delay once he has finished the investigation. The second is an absolute limit, tied to a moment nobody controls: the day on which the act took place.
The plea did not come from a magistrate under investigation, but from the opposite side. Its author had challenged before the administrative court, at the Bucharest Court of Appeal, Eighth Division for administrative and tax litigation, decisions closing her files issued by the Judicial Inspection, two of which relied on the very 2-year period. She argued that the law creates discrimination between magistrates and other citizens, and gave as an example her own situation, in which enforcement proceedings had compelled her to pay a sum of money 2 years and 9 months after her alleged fault. She invoked Article 16(1) and (2) of the Constitution, equality before the law and the rule that nobody is above the law, and Article 124(2), under which justice is unique, impartial and equal for all.
One detail of the procedure says something about its length. The author of the plea died before the file reached hearing, and a death certificate was filed by her husband. The President of the Court informed her representative that he could not make submissions, under Article 83(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, but stated that, although the author had died, the plea would be decided. It was decided on 5 March 2026 and published on 21 September 2026.
What it changes in practice
The first effect is the confirmation of the rule, with the force provided for in Article 147(4) of the Constitution: from 21 September 2026, the decision is generally binding. Anyone challenging in court a closure based on the expiry of the 2 years can no longer build the action on the idea that the period itself is unconstitutional.
The second effect concerns the moment from which the count starts. By reference to its own case law, the Court repeats the idea that disciplinary limitation resembles the limitation of criminal liability, including as regards the moment from which the period starts to run, namely the commission of the act, under Article 154(2) of the Criminal Code. For the person complaining, the consequence is harsh and rarely explained: if he learns of the act a year and a half after it happened, he does not have two years available but six months, and into that interval must fit the complaint, the preliminary check, the disciplinary investigation and the bringing of the action.
The third effect is that the confirmed text lives on under a different number. Law no. 317/2004 was repealed by Law no. 305/2022, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 1105 of 16 November 2022, and the decision gives Article 96(4) of the new law as the basis for the repeal. The Court nevertheless examined the old text, because it continued to produce effects in the dispute before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, and expressly found that the legislative solution has its counterpart in Article 47(7) of Law no. 305/2022. The rule in force today keeps the two periods, 30 days from the completion of the prior disciplinary investigation and no more than 2 years from the act, and adds that the action is brought by the judicial inspector.
The fourth effect is a clarification about who is compared with whom. The Court answers that the principle of equality does not mean uniformity and that the situations the author was comparing, the disciplinary liability of magistrates on the one hand and her being ordered to pay sums through enforcement proceedings on the other, are fundamentally different and therefore cannot be placed side by side. For anyone preparing a similar action, that means the discrimination argument has to be built between two categories in the same legal situation, not between a disciplinary procedure and an enforcement file.
What has changed compared with the previous situation
In the text of the law, nothing has changed. What has changed is the status of the argument: until 21 September 2026, the claim that the 2-year period protects magistrates at the expense of citizens could be put before a court as a ground of unconstitutionality. From that date, it runs into a generally binding decision.
The decision also shows the route the text has taken, which explains why the article number differs from one document to another. The legislative solution was introduced by Article II point 3(7) of Law no. 24/2012, published in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 51 of 23 January 2012, which amended Article 451(7) of Law no. 317/2004. After the republication of the law in the Official Gazette of Romania no. 628 of 1 September 2012, the same text became Article 46(7). Since 2022 it is found in Article 47(7) of Law no. 305/2022. Three numbers, the same rule, unchanged for fourteen years.
Nor has the case law changed. The Court lists its own earlier rulings on the same subject: Decision no. 32 of 30 January 2025, on the alleged discrimination, Decision no. 215 of 17 February 2009, on the comparison of different situations, and Decision no. 816 of 9 December 2021, by which disciplinary limitation had already been found to be in keeping with constitutional requirements. The reasoning says it directly: „no new elements have arisen such as to warrant a reconsideration of the case law of the Constitutional Court”.
Disciplinary limitation is not the only rule of procedure the Court confirmed in September 2026. For police officers the answer went to the procedure itself: an offence committed during the state of emergency is punished without the file passing through the disciplinary board, and the criticism based on the right to a defence was rejected.
Advantages and disadvantages
What it improves
- It closes an uncertainty that had lasted for years: the 2-year period stands, and the administrative courts no longer have reason to stay cases while waiting for a decision of the Court.
- It explains plainly why disciplinary limitation exists, with arguments drawn from criminal law: liability established late loses its effectiveness, and legal relationships in conflict cannot stay open indefinitely.
- It confirms expressly that the rule survives the change of law. The fact that Article 46(7) of Law no. 317/2004 has its counterpart in Article 47(7) of Law no. 305/2022 spares the courts a debate about application over time.
- It sets a useful benchmark for any action based on discrimination: the comparison is made between situations of the same legal nature, not between different procedures that happen to concern the same person.
- The Court decided the case even though the author of the plea had died, which confirms that constitutional review, once started, does not lapse with the party who asked for it.
What remains a problem
- The period runs from the act, not from its discovery. A breach that comes to light only after a case has been finally closed may be time-barred before anyone has had a chance to complain about it, and the decision does not touch this aspect, because it was not asked to.
- The analogy with criminal law, used as the main argument, in fact shows a difference. The periods for the limitation of criminal liability in Article 154 of the Criminal Code start at 3 years and go up to 15, and Article 155 of the same code provides for their interruption by any procedural act. The disciplinary text confirmed by the Court sets 2 years and provides for no ground of interruption or suspension.
- The two periods in the same sentence do not carry the same weight. The 30-day one concerns the judicial inspector and starts when he completes the investigation, so it depends on his own pace. The 2-year one concerns the complainant and starts without his knowing.
- The disciplinary action belongs to the judicial inspector, not to the person who made the complaint. The complainant can only challenge the closure afterwards, in proceedings lasting well beyond the 2 years, including when the period is about to expire.
- The length of the procedure contradicts the reason the period exists. From the referral order of the Bucharest Court of Appeal, made on 10 December 2020, to the publication of the decision, on 21 September 2026, 2,111 days passed, and the author of the plea died in the meantime, without learning the answer.
Practical advice
- If you want to complain about a judge or a prosecutor to the Judicial Inspection, first work out the date of the act, not the date on which you learned of it. From that day you have at most 2 years, and into that interval must fit the preliminary check and the disciplinary investigation, not only the filing of the complaint.
- Do not confuse a disciplinary offence with dissatisfaction about the outcome of a case. The Judicial Inspection cannot change a judgment and cannot reassess the evidence. If your problem is the outcome, the route is the appeal, the second appeal or the other remedies in that case, not a disciplinary complaint.
- When you receive a closure based on limitation, ask in writing to be shown which date of the act was taken into account. The 2 years are counted from that date, and if the date relied on is wrong, that is the question to raise in court, not the constitutionality of the period.
- If you already have proceedings in which you raised exactly this plea, expect it to be rejected. The law does not forbid raising a new plea, since Article 29(3) of Law no. 47/1992 only bars pleas on texts already declared unconstitutional, but the Court has written that no new elements have arisen.
- Check which law applies to your situation. For acts committed after Law no. 305/2022 entered into force, the basis is Article 47(7) of that law, not Article 46(7) of Law no. 317/2004, even though the rule is the same.
- If you are a magistrate and have been brought before the Section for Judges or the Section for Prosecutors, check the date of the act stated in the disciplinary action. Exceeding the 2 years extinguishes the action and is to be raised before any discussion about whether the offence occurred.
Frequently asked questions
From what moment do the 2 years run?
What happens when the 2 years are up?
What is the 30-day period for, then?
Whom does the period protect, the magistrate or the person complaining?
Law no. 317/2004 is repealed. Why does the decision still matter?
Were there any dissenting or concurring opinions?
What happened to the case in which the plea was raised?
From when does the decision produce effects?
Editorial analysis
The decision is sound in relation to the criticisms it received. The author of the plea compared two things that do not compare, the disciplinary liability of magistrates and her own being ordered to pay through enforcement proceedings, and the Court tells her exactly that, with case law that has been constant since 2009. The existence of disciplinary limitation is not in itself an anomaly: if the state loses, after a time, its right to punish an offence, all the more does it lose the right to sanction a disciplinary breach. Up to that point, the reasoning cannot be contradicted.
The problem appears precisely in the analogy it rests on. If disciplinary limitation is justified by its resemblance to criminal limitation, then the figures deserve a look as well: the periods in Article 154 of the Criminal Code start at 3 years, for the lightest acts, punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment or by a fine, and go up to 15 years, and Article 155 allows them to be interrupted by any procedural act, with a fresh period running after each interruption. The disciplinary text confirmed by the Court sets 2 years, that is below the criminal minimum, and provides for no ground of interruption or suspension. The analogy invoked as an argument for the constitutionality of the period shows, read to the end, that the disciplinary period is stricter than the criminal one it imitates.
The second observation calls for counting, because it does not emerge from reading the act. The Bucharest Court of Appeal referred the matter to the Constitutional Court by its order of 10 December 2020, the decision was given on 5 March 2026, after 1,911 days, and published on 21 September 2026, after another 200. That is 2,111 days in all, 2.89 times longer than the 730 days covered by the period confirmed. The state needed almost three limitation periods in order to confirm one limitation period. And the case on the merits, registered at the Bucharest Court of Appeal in 2017, is older still: from the statement setting out the subject of the plea, filed on 21 January 2019, to the publication of the decision, more than seven and a half years passed. The author of the plea died along the way.
The third observation comes out of combining the two periods in the same sentence. The 30-day one starts when the judicial inspector finishes the investigation, so it depends on the institution’s pace. The 2-year one starts when the act took place, so it depends on nobody. The practical result is that the complainant’s real window lasts as long as whatever is left of the 2 years after the act has been discovered, and into that remainder must fit the complaint, the preliminary check, the disciplinary investigation and the bringing of the action. In a field where breaches often come to light only when a case is closed, that means limitation is sometimes complete before anyone could have found out what happened. The criticism is aimed at the text the Court found constitutional, not at its ruling, which decides only what it is asked.
What should be changed
- The period should run from the date on which the act became known or could have become known, with a longer absolute limit. The usual formula, a short period from discovery coupled with a long one from the act, would leave the rationale of limitation intact and would remove the situation in which a breach is time-barred before it could have been complained of.
- The law should expressly provide for the suspension of the period while the preliminary checks and the disciplinary investigation are under way. Today the institution’s delay consumes the complainant’s time, even though he has no means of speeding it up. A ground of suspension would move the cost of delay to where it is produced.
- A closure based on limitation should be required to state the date of the act relied on and the date of the complaint. Without those two dates, the complainant cannot check whether the period really has expired, and the administrative court starts from an assertion rather than from a calculation.
- The 2-year period should be aligned at least with the criminal minimum of 3 years, if the analogy with criminal law is to remain the argument. Otherwise a disciplinary offence is time-barred sooner than the lightest criminal offence, and the justification invoked by the Court works against the text it defends.
- Law no. 47/1992 should set a deadline for publishing decisions after they are given. The 200 days between 5 March 2026 and 21 September 2026 are days in which the decision existed but produced no effects, while the cases awaiting the answer stayed on hold for no procedural reason at all.
Original text of the legal act
The text below is reproduced in Romanian, the official form of publication.
The full text, as published in the Official Gazette of Romania
Official Gazette of Romania no. 798 of 21 September 2026, pages 4-6 16 pages PDF, 102 KB the act starts on page 4
Open the official PDFDownload the PDF
The viewer is not shown on small screens. Use the buttons above to open or download the file.
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For specific situations, consult a licensed attorney or tax advisor.
