Court stamp duty stays as it is: Constitutional Court rejects 18 cases in one decision

Eighteen cases opened over five years against court stamp duty have ended without any change to the rules. The Constitutional Court joined eighteen cases opened between 2021 and 2025 by individuals, companies and associations, plus one court that raised the plea of its own motion, and rejected them all. Government Emergency Ordinance no. 80/2013 on court stamp duty and Government Emergency Ordinance no. 51/2008 on public legal aid in civil matters are constitutional in relation to the criticisms made. The decision is final and generally binding, just like the one in which the Court held that appeal in administrative litigation remains limited to grounds of illegality.

The attack did not target one article or another, but the two ordinances in their entirety. The authors argued that the Government was not allowed to regulate by emergency ordinance a matter belonging to the organisation of the courts and to judicial procedure, that is, to the field of organic law, and that the ordinance on stamp duty had not even been approved by Parliament in all these years. They also invoked the fact that the ordinance had been countersigned by a state secretary rather than by the minister, and that the opinion of the Superior Council of Magistracy had not been sought.

On the merits, the criticisms touched on things felt by anyone who starts a lawsuit: the obligation to pay the duty before the court rules, the penalty of having the claim annulled in case of non-payment, the fact that the request for review of the duty is heard by the same court and cannot be challenged, the difficulty of identifying the local budget into which the duty must be paid, and the lack of clear rules on proof of online payment.

The income thresholds at which this aid is granted, 300 and 600 lei, were reviewed separately in CCR Decision no. 169/2026, which upheld them as they stand.

What it changes in practice

The first effect is that advance payment remains the rule. The Court repeats what it had already said in Decisions no. 811/2018 and no. 369/2020: Romanian law states clearly in which situations the duty is owed, how it is calculated and what happens if it is not paid, and the claimant can reasonably expect these rules to be applied. Since payment of the duty is a legal condition for seising the court, both the obligation to pay in advance and the penalty of annulling the claim are justified.

The second effect concerns the review. Anyone who considers that the duty was wrongly set may ask for a review, but the procedure stays as it is: it is heard by a different panel of the same court, in chambers, without summoning the parties and with no right of appeal against the interlocutory ruling. The Court explains why: the procedure is governed by the principle of speed, which would be seriously affected if oral argument, adversarial debate, summoning and a right of appeal were added. And it repeats a formula that runs through all of its case law: free access to justice does not mean access to all judicial structures and to all levels of jurisdiction.

The third effect is one of legislative technique, but with long reach. The ban on regulating in the field of organic law concerns only ordinary Government ordinances, issued on the basis of an enabling law. Emergency ordinances are not a variety of these, but an act adopted directly under Article 115 (4) of the Constitution, and there no such limitation exists. Consequently, the Government could regulate stamp duty by emergency ordinance.

The fourth effect clears up something that is often misread. The Constitution does not make the entry into force of an emergency ordinance conditional on an approval law adopted by Parliament. Only two things are needed: submission for debate under the emergency procedure to the competent Chamber and publication in the Official Gazette of Romania. The Court shows that the draft approval law was submitted to the Senate on 28 June 2013, the ordinance was published on 29 June 2013, the Senate adopted the draft on 21 October 2013, and on 28 October 2013 it was registered with the Chamber of Deputies. The condition was therefore met.

The fifth effect concerns the signature on the ordinance. Countersignature by a state secretary, instead of the minister, is not a defect. The Court examines the legal framework in force when the ordinance was issued, Article 49 (3) and Article 51 of Law no. 90/2001, plus Article 10 (8) of Government Decision no. 34/2009, and finds that delegating the minister’s powers to a state secretary was a lawful and foreseeable procedure. The Constitution requires a valid countersignature, made by the person competent under the law, not the minister’s personal signature.

The sixth effect is the most useful one for future cases. The absence of the opinion of the Superior Council of Magistracy cannot on its own lead to unconstitutionality. In a concrete review, started from a plea raised before a court, Article 1 (3) and (5) read together with Article 134 (4) of the Constitution is not a benchmark that stands alone: a direct link must be shown between the missing opinion and the breach of a fundamental right. If no right has been breached, the discussion about the opinion does not even take place.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

As regards the rules, nothing. Government Emergency Ordinance no. 80/2013 remains in the form it had before the decision, and the Court says explicitly that no new elements have arisen that would call for reconsidering its case law, so the solutions and the reasoning of the earlier decisions keep their validity.

Something else has changed, though, and it matters for anyone planning a lawsuit on the same subject: the level at which the discussion is closed. Until now, the criticisms of the ordinance had been narrow, article by article. Here the Court examined the two acts as a whole, under almost thirty constitutional provisions relied on, plus articles from the European Convention on Human Rights, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The result covers practically every angle of attack available.

A second clarification concerns the arguments that do not even get to be analysed. The Court lists them: the right to life and to mental integrity, individual liberty, private life, the inviolability of the home, the secrecy of correspondence, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, the right of association, work, the ban on forced labour, the right to strike, the standard of living, the right of petition, loyalty to the country. All were invoked in these cases and all were found to have no connection with the subject matter of the regulation.

The third clarification targets online payment. The authors pointed out that the act does not explain how electronic payment is proven, and that banks use signatures which cannot be verified on the paper filed with the case. The Court does not dispute the problem, but classifies it differently: these are matters of applying the law, not of constitutionality. The same classification is given to the difficulty of identifying the local budget into which the duty is paid, raised by litigants who have no domicile, residence or registered office in Romania and to whom, under Article 40 (2) of the ordinance, the budget of the unit where the court has its seat applies.

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