Public legal aid does not cover the security deposit required to halt enforcement

You can be exempted from the court fee because you cannot afford it, and still be asked for a security deposit in order to halt enforcement provisionally. The Constitutional Court has dismissed as inadmissible the plea seeking to have public legal aid cover the security deposit as well, by Decision no. 106 of 5 February 2026, now published in the Official Gazette of Romania. This is the second time in recent months that the public legal aid mechanism has come before the Court, after the decision in which the old income thresholds for granting it were examined.

The provision at issue is art. 6 lit. d) of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 51/2008 on public legal aid in civil matters: „Public legal aid may be granted in the following forms: […] d) exemptions, reductions, instalment arrangements or deferrals from the payment of the court fees provided for by law, including those payable at the enforcement stage.” The criticism targeted the closing phrase, „including those payable at the enforcement stage”, because it does not also cover the security deposit.

The case itself shows the stakes clearly. Ioana-Roxana Pirsa had filed, before the Cornetu District Court, an application to set aside enforcement, an application for a provisional stay of enforcement and an application for public legal aid in order to be exempted from paying the security deposit. The referring court considered the plea unfounded, pointing out that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on rules alleged to be incomplete, because that would amount to intervening directly in the legislative process.

What it changes in practice

The first effect is the practical one. The security deposit remains outside the forms of public legal aid listed in art. 6. Anyone applying for a provisional stay of enforcement must lodge it out of their own resources, even after obtaining an exemption from the court stamp duty.

The second effect concerns the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction. The reasoning behind the plea in fact targeted a legislative omission without constitutional relevance. Under art. 2 para. (3) of Law no. 47/1992, such an omission cannot be remedied in constitutional review proceedings.

The third effect concerns the division of roles between the branches of government. The Court recalls that, under art. 61 para. (1) of the Constitution, amending or supplementing legal rules is an exclusive prerogative of Parliament. If public legal aid is to be extended to the security deposit, the decision belongs to the legislature.

The fourth effect is the test the Court restates, worth remembering for anyone relying on a gap in the law. A legislative omission has constitutional relevance only if it itself gives rise to the breach of the fundamental right alleged to have been infringed. Without that link, the criticism cannot be examined.

The fifth effect is the consolidation of a line of case law. The Court cites Decision no. 895 of 6 July 2010, Decision no. 502 of 7 October 2014, Decision no. 504 of 4 July 2017 and Decision no. 98 of 16 February 2021, all reaching the same outcome on similar criticisms. The argument has therefore been rejected repeatedly for more than fifteen years.

What has changed compared with the previous situation

In law, nothing. The wording of art. 6 lit. d) remains unchanged, and the forms of public legal aid are the same: exemptions, reductions, instalment arrangements or deferrals from the payment of the court fees provided for by law, including those payable at the enforcement stage.

What has changed is the clarity of a point that many litigants discover only in the courtroom. An exemption from the court fee does not automatically extend to every sum the court asks for in the course of the proceedings. The security deposit has a different regime and a different purpose, and the law does not list it among the forms of aid.

The second clarification concerns the way a plea is framed. The Court states plainly that the applicant’s submissions are not genuine criticisms of unconstitutionality, but seek to supplement the statutory text. A request that begins with „the law ought also to provide for” has, structurally, that problem.

The third clarification is one of timing. The referral was made by the Interlocutory Judgment of 2 February 2021 of the Cornetu District Court, the decision was delivered on 5 February 2026 and published on 22 July 2026. The application to set aside enforcement from which it all started has been pending for five years.

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